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"You're Fired! And Don't Forget Your Non-Compete..

The Enforceability of Restrictive Covenants in
Involuntary Discharge Cases
Kenneth J. Vanko'

I.

INTRODUCTION

Employment contracts that contain restrictive covenants rarely condition their enforceability on the method of separation. Indeed, most
contracts are highly pro-employer, such that a covenant not to compete purports to take effect upon resignation or termination for any
reason whatsoever. Most employers who seek to include a restrictive
covenant in an employment agreement do so to prevent the unexpected resignation of a key executive or salesperson and the subsequent formation of a competing entity, which would be able to take
advantage of client relationships or business know-how gained at the
employer's expense. On the other hand, the vast majority of employers give comparatively less thought to the enforceability of the covenant in cases involving discharge, as opposed to those involving
resignation. Initially, an employer may underestimate the threat a departed employee poses and may not realize the extent to which its
client base or goodwill is threatened until the ex-employee starts competing. Because employment agreements are normally drafted in the
employer's favor, a company official may examine the contract and
believe that the covenant is enforceable against a discharged employee regardless of how the working relationship ended. The analysis, however, is not that simple. Strict considerations of fairness
suggest that it is antithetical to allow an employer to terminate an
employee and prevent him from working in his chosen profession.
Moreover, the courts' traditional reluctance to enforce restrictive covenants,2 in conjunction with the value that our society places on the
free mobility of employees, 3 would seem to compel a court to invali1. Mr. Vanko is an associate attorney at the law firm of Clingen, Callow, Wolfe & McLean,
LLC in Wheaton, Illinois. He concentrates his practice in the areas of commercial litigation and
employment law.
2. See Huntington Eye Assoc., Inc. v. LoCascio, 553 S.E.2d 773, 780 (W. Va. 2001) (stating
that covenant is void on its face if it "appears designed to intimidate employees rather than
protect the employer's business").
3. See infra Part III.
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date a covenant in an involuntary discharge case. However, courts
have not established any clear rules to provide judges, lawyers and
parties with guidance in termination cases. The law in this area is relatively undeveloped, perhaps because so few termination cases have
made their way through the reported decisions or the courts have not
given them much reasoned analysis. Nevertheless, given the proliferation of restrictive covenants, especially considering en masse lay-offs
and the fallout in the high-tech industry, 4 these issues are likely to
arise with greater frequency, and the different approaches that courts
have used are just as likely to confound litigants.
Following Part II, a brief overview of the law concerning restrictive
covenants, Parts III.A., III.B., and III.C. analyze the current approaches courts have utilized in judging the enforceability of covenants in the involuntary termination context. Part III.D. explores how
restrictive covenants have been addressed in other non-traditional
employment separations, such as the expiration of an employment
term contract, constructive discharge, and assignment of the contract
to a business purchaser. Parts IV and V conclude with some practical
advice for avoiding a costly legal dispute when an employer seeks to
bind a discharged worker to a covenant not to compete.
II.

BACKGROUND

While nineteen states regulate restrictive covenants by statute, the
rest do so by common law. 5 In the employee context, restrictive covenants generally span four different areas: (1) general non-competition;
(2) customer (or client) non-solicitation; (3) employee non-solicitation; and (4) non-disclosure. A brief overview of the general rules
with respect to each type of covenant follows.

4. See William Lynch Schaller, Jumping Ship: Legal Issues Relating to Employee Mobility in
High Tech. Indus., 17 LAB. LAW 25 (Summer 2001) (providing an excellent discussion of restrictive covenants in the information technology industry).
5. See ALA. CODE § 8-1-1 (2001); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 2002); COLO.
§ § 8-2-113(2), 8-2-113(3) (West 2002); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 542.335 (West
2002); GA. CODE ANN. § 13-8-2.1 (2001); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 480-4(c)(4) (Michie 2001);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:921 (West 2002); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.772 (West 2002);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-703 (West 2002); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. 613.200 (Michie 2002); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 75-4 (2002); N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-08-06 (2002); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 217
(West 2002); OR. REV. STAT. § 653.295 (2002); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 53-9-11 (Michie 2002);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-101 (2002); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § § 15.50-52 (Vernon
2002); W. VA. CODE § 47-18-3(a) (2002); WiS. STAT. ANN. § 103.465 (West 2002).
REV. STAT. ANN.
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Non-Competition Clauses

Non-competition clauses seek to restrict an employee from working
for a competitor upon departure and are carefully scrutinized by

courts. Although the precise tests for governing the validity of a noncompete covenant vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, most states
have adopted a modified version of Section 187 of the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts and require that non-competition clauses be:

(1) ancillary to a valid contract; (2) necessary to protect an employer's
legitimate business interest; and (3) reasonable in terms of activity,
6
duration and geographic scope.

The doctrine of ancillarity is often met with ease, especially if the
employee executes the restrictive covenant at the inception of the employment relationship, or upon a change in the employee's status,
such as a promotion or significant pay raise. 7 Litigation on the ancil-

larity requirement frequently involves an employer's attempt to bind a
current employee to a non-compete at some midpoint during the
course of his employment, often threatening discharge if the employee
refuses to cooperate. 8 Most states hold that, for at-will employees,
continued employment constitutes sufficient consideration for the execution of a restrictive covenant, 9 although the reasoning varies

among jurisdictions. 10 However, a minority of states, such as South
6. BDO Seidman v. Hirshberg, 712 N.E.2d 1220, 1223 (N.Y. 1999); Ellis v. James V. Hurson
Assoc., Inc., 565 A.2d 615, 618-19 (D.C. 1989); Sidco Paper Co v. Aaron, 351 A.2d 250, 252 (Pa.
1976); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE § 15.50(a) (Vernon 2002).
7. See Jostens, Inc. v. Nat'l Computer Sys., Inc., 318 N.W.2d 691, 703-04 (Minn. 1982) (holding
that non-compete agreements lacked consideration because employer did not provide employees with future benefits, raises or promotions).
8. Comment "b" to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 187 provides, in part: "A promise made subsequent to the transaction or relationship is not ancillary to it. In the case of a
continuing transaction or relationship, however, it is enough if the promise is made before its
termination, as long as it is supported by consideration and meets the other requirements of
enforceability." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 187 cmt. b (1979). Cf. Tatge v.
Chambers & Owen, Inc., 579 N.W.2d 217, 223-24 (Wis. 1998) (refusing to recognize cause of
action for wrongful discharge based on employer's termination of employee for refusing to sign
non-competition and non-disclosure agreement); Madden v. Omega Optical, Inc., 683 A.2d 386,
391 (Vt. 1996) (refusing to recognize cause of action for wrongful discharge based on employer's
termination of employee for refusing to sign Confidentiality, Disclosure, and Noncompetition
Agreement).
9. See Computer Sales Int'l, Inc. v. Collins, 723 S.W.2d 450, 452 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (holding
continued employment is sufficient consideration for execution of restrictive covenant by at-will
employee).
10. See Mattison v. Johnston, 730 P.2d 286, 290 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (finding that employee's
continued employment for a period of almost three months constituted sufficient consideration
for execution of non-compete clause where employee terminated relationship); Cent. Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Ingram, 678 S.W.2d 28, 35 (Tenn. 1984) (holding whether consideration
exists is a function of the length of employment following execution of restrictive covenant and
the circumstances of the discharge); Thomas v. Coastal Indus. Servs., Inc., 108 S.E.2d 328, 329
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Carolina and North Carolina, disagree and hold that other consideration must be provided to an at-will employee, rather than just continued employment." A valid non-compete clause can be ancillary to
other types of agreements, such as independent contractor agree4
ments,12 change-of-control agreements, 13 shareholder agreements,'
settlement agreements,' 5 lease agreements,' 6 or as part of the sale of a
business.' 7 The ancillarity doctrine is more closely scrutinized in the
traditional employment relationship, since the employee normally
lacks bargaining power that may be present in these other business
transactions. Non-compete litigation often focuses on whether the
former employer is seeking to protect a legitimate business interest by
restraining the departed employee from working in a similar position
for a competitor."' It is widely agreed that "[a] covenant not to compete cannot be used to prevent competition per se;" rather, an employer must seek to protect a proprietary interest through its
enforcement of the covenant. 19 What qualifies as a legitimate business interest varies from state to state, but customer relationships and
20
trade secrets are the most widely recognized protectable interests.
(Ga. 1959) (finding that consideration is furnished by actual performance of continued
employment).
11. See Poole v. Incentives Unlimited, Inc., 548 S.E.2d 207, 209 (S.C. 2001) (holding continued
employment not sufficient consideration for covenant not to compete) Kadis v. Britt, 29 S.E.2d
543, 548-49 (N.C. 1944) (same).
12. See Eichmann v. Nat'l Hosp. & Health Care Servs., Inc., 719 N.E.2d 1141, 1145 (I11.App.
Ct. 1999) (addressing non-competition covenant in independent contractor relationship).
13. See Szomjassy v. OHM Corp., 132 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1048-50 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (addressing
restrictive covenant in change-of control-agreement).
14. See Central Water Works Supply, Inc. v. Fisher, 608 N.E.2d 618, 622 (Il1. App. Ct. 1993)
(equating non-competition clause in shareholder agreement with that incident to sale of
business).
15. See Herndon v. The Eli Witt Co., 420 So. 2d 920, 923 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (addressing
non-compete in settlement agreement); Justin Belt Co. v. Yost, 502 S.W.2d 681, 684 (Tex. 1974)
(holding covenant not to compete entered as a result of an out-of-court settlement was valid and
ancillary to a permissible transaction).
16. See J.C. Nichols Co v. Eddie Bauer, Inc., 4 F. Supp. 2d 875, 876 (W.D. Mo. 1998) (addressing restrictive covenant preventing sportswear retailer from operating additional stores within
certain geographic area).
17. See Snow Country Const., Inc. v. Laabs, 989 P.2d 847, 849-50 (Mont. 1999) (holding that
statutory exception allowing for covenant not to compete when the goodwill of a business has
been sold applies equally to stock and asset sales).
18. See Katherine R. Schoofs, Comment, Employer Beware: Missouri Puts Brakes on Interrests Protected By a Restrictive Covenant, 70 UMKC L. REV. 171 (Fall 2001) (discussing the
scope of protectable interests).
19. Valley Med. Specialists v. Farber, 982 P.2d 1277, 1281 (Ariz. 1999).
20. See Easy Returns Midwest, Inc. v. Schultz, 964 S.W.2d 450, 453 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that customer contacts and trade secrets are protectable interests of employer); Paramount
Termite Control Co v. Rector, 380 S.E.2d 922, 925 (Va. 1989) (finding that customer contacts of
former employees and knowledge of Paramount's methods of operation warrant the need for
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Some states, such as Illinois, have refined the business interest test so
that only "near-permanent" customer relationships qualify.21 Other
states, such as Utah, New York and Maryland, include unique services
among legitimate business interests. 22 Kentucky, Pennsylvania and
Georgia hold that employee training falls within the rubric of legitimate business interests,2 3 while New Hampshire and Washington reject this theory and hold that an employer's interest in recouping the
costs associated with "recruiting and hiring employees" is not protectable through a non-compete clause. 24 Florida and Tennessee recognize this interest, but with a distinction, by mandating that an
employer must show "extraordinary or specialized training" before a
restrictive covenant can be enforced. 25 Lastly, in Texas and Massachusetts, as well as many other states, goodwill is a protected employer interest.2 6 With regards to the final requirement that
covenants must be reasonable in scope, "scope" actually encompasses
three factors: activity, duration, and geographical limit. 27 Some states,
such as New Hampshire, Iowa and Texas, adopt the Restatement test
non-competition agreements); Ridley v. Krout, 180 P.2d 124, 129 (Wyo. 1947) (stating that special facts that make a restrictive covenant reasonable include: possession of trade secrets, confidential information communicated by employer and special influence with customer obtained
while employed).
21. See Office Mates 5, North Shore, Inc. v. Hazen, 599 N.E.2d 1072, 1080-1083 (Ill. App. Ct.
1992) (articulating near-permanency requirement).
22. See System Concepts, Inc. v. Dixon, 669 P.2d 421, 426 (Utah 1983) (holding that unique
services of employee is protectable employer interest); Reed, Roberts Assocs. v. Strauman, 353
N.E.2d 590, 593 (N.Y. 1976) (same); Becker v. Bailey, 299 A.2d 835, 838 (Md. 1973) (same).
23. See Borg-Warner Protective Servs. Corp. v. Guardsmark, Inc., 946 F. Supp. 495, 500-02
(E.D. Ky. 1996) (protecting employer's interests in training and development costs of employees); Thermo-Guard, Inc. v. Cochran, 596 A.2d 188,193-94 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (same); WesleyJessen, Inc. v. Armento, 519 F. Supp. 1352, 1358 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (same).
24. See National Employment Serv. Corp. v. Olsten Staffing Serv., Inc., 761 A.2d 401, 405
(N.H. 2000) (rejecting employee training as protectable interest); Copier Specialists, Inc, v. Gillen, 887 P.2d 919, 920 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that, in absence of other protectable interests, training of employee did not warrant enforcement of non-competition agreement).
25. See Hapney v. Cent. Garage, Inc., 579 So. 2d 127, 131 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (holding
that "extraordinary or specialized training" is a legitimate employer interest), rev'd on other
grounds, 579 So. 2d 127 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991); Vantage Tech., LLC v. Cross, 17 S.W.3d 637,
644-45 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999) (stating that "employer may have a protectable interest in the
unique knowledge and skill that an employee receives through special training by his employer,
at least when such training is present along with other factors tending to show a protectable
interest.").
26. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE § 15.50(a) (Vernon 2002) (including employer goodwill as
protectable interest); IKON Office Solutions, Inc. v. Belanger, 59 F. Supp. 2d 125, 128 (D. Mass.
1999) (holding that goodwill of employer is a protectable interest, if employee cultivated his
relationship with the client during his employment with the employer).
27. See Pinnacle Performance, Inc. v. Hessing, 17 P.3d 308, 311 (Idaho Ct. App. 2001) (noting
parameters of reasonableness inquiry); UARCO Inc. v. Lam, 18 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1121 (D. Haw.
1998) (same).
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to determine reasonableness and examine three factors: (1) whether
the restriction is greater than necessary to protect the business and
goodwill of the employer; (2) whether the employer's need for protection outweighs the economic hardship which the covenant imposes on

the departing party; and (3) whether the restriction adversely affects
the interests of the public. 28 If a court determines that a non-compete
is overbroad in terms of a durational2 9 or geographic 30 limit, then

most will modify them, either under a reasonableness standard 3' or
the "blue-pencil" doctrine, 32 so that they are narrowly tailored to protect the employer's interest. A minority group of states, including Nebraska and Arkansas, reject both modification doctrines and will void
33
overbroad covenants.
B.

Customer Non-Solicitation Covenants

A customer, or client, non-solicitation covenant is an activity re-

straint. Put another way, it does not prevent an employee from working for a competitor, but only prohibits the solicitation of a former
employer's clients. 34 Because these covenants do not restrain an em28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 (1979); Olsten Staffing, 761 A.2d at 403;
Phone Connection, Inc. v. Harbst, 494 N.W.2d 445, 449 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992); Peat Marwick
Main & Co. v. Haass, 818 S.W.2d 381, 386 (Tex. 1991); see also Harlan M. Blake, Employee
Agreements Not to Compete, HARV. L. REV. 625, 648-49 (1960) (stating three-pronged rule of
reason inquiry).
29. See Ferrofluidics Corp. v. Advanced Vacuum Components, Inc., 968 F.2d 1463, 1469 (1st
Cir. 1992) (upholding district court's revision of non-compete clause from five to three years).
But see Stone v. Griffin Communications & Sec. Sys., Inc., 53 S.W.3d 687, 696 (Tex. Ct. App.
2001) (upholding five-year covenant not to compete as a reasonable time restriction), rev'd on
other grounds, 71 S.W.3d 381 (Tex. App. 2001).
30. See Camco, Inc. v. Baker, 936 P.2d 829, 833-34 (Nev. 1997) (holding that territorial restriction of fifty miles was overbroad since it extended beyond area where employer established
customer contacts and goodwill); Smart Corp. v. Grider, 650 N.E.2d 80, 84-85 (Ind. Ct. App.
1995) (modifying covenant not to compete so that employee was restrained only from doing
business in area where she developed and serviced clients). But see Kimball v. Anesthesia Specialists of Baton Rouge, Inc., 809 So. 2d 405, 409-12 (La. Ct. App. 2001) (refusing to enforce
covenant not to compete when no specific parish or municipality was delineated as geographical
restriction under state statute requiring such specificity).
31. See Data Mgmt., Inc. v. Greene, 757 P.2d 62, 64-65 (Alaska 1988) (rejecting "blue-pencil"
doctrine as too "mechanical" and modifying covenant not to compete under "rule of reasonableness" so that legitimate interest of employer is protected).
32. See Licocci v. Cardinal Assocs., Inc., 432 N.E.2d 446, 452 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982) (using
"blue-pencil" doctrine to delete offending provisions of restrictive covenant), vacated on other
grounds, 445 N.E.2d 556 (Ind. 1983).
33. See CAE Vanguard v. Newman, 518 N.W.2d 652, 655-56 (Neb. 1994) (rejecting court modification of covenants); Rector-Phillips-Morse, Inc. v. Vroman, 489 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Ark. 1973)
(holding that the court will not reduce the restriction to a shorter time or smaller area; thus
making a new contract).
34. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Ran, 67 F. Supp. 2d 764, 774 (E.D. Mich.
1999) (upholding as reasonable a one-year customer "anti-piracy" clause).
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ployee from pursuing a particular line of work, they are far less likely
to be invalidated in a judicial proceeding. Just as is the case with more
restrictive non-competes, customer non-solicitation clauses are judged
by a standard of reasonableness and are usually upheld when the employer enabled the employee to develop lasting customer contacts and
when the covenant is tailored to protect that interest. 35 Conversely, a

court is likely to invalidate a customer non-solicitation covenant that
prohibits an employee from soliciting clients or customers with whom
he had no contact or business relationship. 36 In Illinois, for instance,

non-solicitation clauses are not valid for every type of salesperson.
An employer must still show that the customer relationship sought to
be protected is "near-permanent," which does not allow an employer
to prevent solicitation if the sales function involves "cold-calling," if
there is relatively little customer loyalty, or if the good or service pro37
vided is fungible.
C. Employee Non-Solicitation Covenants

With one startling exception, employee non-solicitation covenants
have met with relatively little judicial resistance, as courts have held
that it is reasonable for an employer to protect its investment in training its staff and maintaining a competent workforce. 38 Nevertheless,
they are still strictly construed against the drafting party and will not
preclude a party from hiring a competitor's employees if such passive
solicitation is not expressly prohibited. 39 Some states will even void
an employee non-solicitation covenant that bars the mere hiring of an
35. See Corson v. Universal Door Sys., Inc., 596 So. 2d 565, 568-69 (Ala. 1991) (emphasizing
importance of employer's role in introducing employee to key customers).
36. See Hulcher Servs., Inc. v. R.J. Corman R.R. Co., 543 S.E.2d 461, 467 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000)
(holding that employer had no protectable interest in preventing employee from soliciting customers that employee did not know on professional level).
37. See Dam, Snell & Teveirne, Ltd. V. Verchota, 754 N.E.2d 464, 469-70 (I11.App. Ct. 2001)
(employing same "near-permanency" test for non-solicitation clauses); Henri Studio, Inc. v. Outdoor Mktg., Inc., No. 96 C 8198, 1997 WL 652351, at *4 (N.D. I11.Oct. 14, 1997) (finding no
"near-permanent" customer relationship in sales-driven business; emphasizing that customer
names were readily available and accessible; customers attended trade shows where plaintiff's
competitors were present; sales were based on individual purchase orders; no exclusivity agreements; customers purchased goods from multiple manufacturers); Office Mates 5, North Shore,
Inc. v. Hazen, 599 N.E.2d 1072, 1082-86 (ttl. App. Ct. 1992) (involving account executives with
office support personnel placement agency where names of businesses with needs were wellknown, clients used many placement agencies; cold-calling was common; fifty percent of clients
never returned and two-thirds of clients had less than a three-year relationship).
38. See Balasco v. Gulf Auto Holding, Inc., 707 So. 2d 858, 860 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)
(noting importance of workforce stability).
39. See Atmel Corp. v. Vitesse Semiconductor Corp., 30 P.3d 789, 793 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001)
(examining custom of semiconductor industry to hold that only "active" solicitation was prohibited); Warner & Co. v. Solberg, 634 N.W.2d 65, 73 (N.D. 2001) (upholding employee non-solici-
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employee, as opposed to more active, aggressive efforts to recruit
40

away key talent.
Missouri courts take an altogether different approach, holding that

a former employee's covenant not to solicit or encourage other employees to terminate their employment is void as an unenforceable

restraint of trade. 41 The reasoning behind this rather unique rule is
that an employer's interest in its at-will employees, or their skills, is
not a proprietary interest worthy of protection through a restrictive
covenant. 42 It remains to be seen whether Missouri's approach will be

adopted in other states.
D. Non-Disclosure Covenants

The final category of restrictive covenants, non-disclosure agreements, has proven to be even less problematic than employee nonsolicitation covenants. Employee confidentiality clauses are almost always upheld if they are reasonable, but some courts have invalidated,
or modified, clauses that are clearly overbroad in terms of the type of
information they seek to prevent from disclosure.4 3 Even in the ab-

sence of a confidentiality agreement, an employee may be bound not
to disclose proprietary information as a common law duty.44 The real

value of such agreements for an employer is two-fold: (1) to identify
and prevent from disclosure certain business-specific categories of in-

formation that may not otherwise qualify as a trade secret;4 5 and (2) to
provide for liquidated damages in the event of disclosure.4 6

tation covenant which was "narrowly drawn" to penalize only active solicitation by departed
employee).
40. See Loral Corp. v. Moyes, 219 Cal. Rptr. 836, 841-43 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that
hiring prohibition is void under Section 16600 of Business and Professions Code).
41. Schmersahl, Treloar & Co., v. McHugh, 28 S.W.3d 345, 351 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000).
42. Id. at 350-51.
43. See Trailer Leasing Co. v. Assocs. Commercial Corp., No. 96 C2305, 1996 WL 392135, at
*6 (N.D. I11.July 10, 1996) (holding that agreement barring employee from disclosing "any methods or manners" of business was unenforceable); Nasco, Inc. v. Gimbert, 238 S.E.2d 368, 369-70
(Ga. 1977) (holding that non-disclosure covenant barring use or disclosure of "any information
concerning any matters affecting or relating to the business of employer" was overbroad and
unenforceable).
44. See Anderson Chem. Co. v. Green, 66 S.W.3d 434, 442 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001) (imposing
duty on employee under common law not to disclose employer's confidential information).
45. See Bernier v. Merrill Air Eng'rs, 770 A.2d 97, 103 (Me. 2001) (holding that confidential
information protected under agreement need not be limited to trade secrets under Maine's version of Uniform Trade Secrets Act).
46. See Overholt Crop Ins. Co. v. Travis, 941 F.2d 1361, 1369-70 (8th Cir. 1991) (stating that,
under either South Dakota or Minnesota law, liquidated damages of twice the amount of premiums lost by insurance agency were reasonable estimate of damages that were difficult to calculate following breach of non-solicitation and non-disclosure covenants).
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ANALYSIS

Although all types of restrictive covenants are judged by a standard
of reasonableness, the question remains as to whether it is reasonable
to enforce a covenant not to compete when an employee is terminated. The answer, according to the reported judicial decisions, is
anything but clear. Sections A, B and C describe the judicial treatment given to restrictive covenants in cases where an employer discharges an employee. Following this summary of the judicial rules
developed in termination cases, Section D will examine restrictive
covenants in those employment separations that do not fit neatly into
the categories of either resignation or termination.
A.

Non-Competition Covenants

Courts have taken three approaches to analyzing whether general
non-competition clauses are enforceable in discharge cases. The first,
as forcefully articulated by New York courts, holds that such covenants are per se invalid when the employer discharges the employee
without cause. 47 The second line of cases, representing the majority
position, adopts a middle ground; rather than creating a per se rule in
favor of either an employee or employer, these courts require a 'plus
factor' to determine enforceability and normally examine the nature
of the employer's conduct in effectuating the termination. 48 In Pennsylvania, for instance, a non-compete is presumptively invalid in a termination case, but can be enforced in certain circumstances where a
protectable interest is threatened. 49 In many states, such as Minnesota, Massachusetts and Texas, courts examine whether the termination was conducted arbitrarily or in bad faith.50 Other states, such as
South Dakota and Missouri, give the trial judge the discretion to consider the involuntary nature of the discharge in a flexible balancing
the equities approach.5 1 The third and final analysis, which only the
Florida courts have adopted so far, is decidedly pro-employer and
holds that a court cannot consider an involuntary termination in determining the enforceability of a non-compete clause.5 2
47. See infra Part III.A.1 (addressing cases holding that covenant is per se invalid).
48. See infra Part III.A.2 (analyzing the middle ground - presumption against enforcement,

bad faith, or balancing the equities approach).
49. See infra Part III.A.2.a (examining the presumption against enforcement approach).
50. See infra Part III.A.2.b (examining bad faith cases and the employer-focused approach).
51. See infra Part III.A.2.c (discussing cases employing the balancing the equities analysis).
52. See infra Part III.A.3 (analyzing cases which hold that discharge is not a factor to

consider).
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1. Cases Holding That Covenant Is Per Se Invalid
Only one jurisdiction has adopted a bright-line, pro-employee view
on enforcing non-competition clauses in termination cases. New York
courts have articulated a per se rule, such that an employee who is
terminated without cause is not bound by a non-compete clause. In
Post v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,53 the New York
Court of Appeals examined the enforceability of non-competition
clauses that applied to a group of employees who had been terminated
without cause from Merrill Lynch. Merrill Lynch's pension plan had a
"forfeiture-for-competition" clause, which denied employees their
pension benefits if they competed with the firm after departure. 54 The
Court, in broad language, held that the covenants were void, and the
employees' pension benefits could not be forfeited. 55 In so holding,
the Court stated:
An essential aspect of [the employment relationship] ... is the employer's willingness to employ the party covenanting not to compete. Where the employer terminates the employment relationship
without cause, however, his action necessarily destroys the mutuality of obligation on which the covenant
rests as well as the em56
ployer's ability to impose forfeiture.
The analysis used in Post is limited to those cases in which an employee has been terminated without cause. In subsequent New York
decisions, courts have routinely applied Post to involuntary terminations without cause and have struck down non-competes as invalid per
se. 57 The logical corollary to this rule, of course, is that terminations
for cause are not included, and that the restrictive covenants would
not be invalidated on this basis.
The New York courts made this for cause/without cause distinction
in two recent federal cases, Gismondi, Paglia, Sherling, M.D., P.C. v.
Franco58 and Cray v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co.59 In these cases, the
courts held that Post does not apply when an employee violates his
employment contract and is terminated for cause. 60 In Franco, the
53. Post v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 397 N.E.2d 358 (N.Y. 1979).
54. Id. at 359.
55. Id. at 360-61.
56. Id.
57. SIFCO Indus., Inc. v. Advanced Plating Techs., Inc., 867 F. Supp. 155, 158-59 (S.D.N.Y.
1994).
58. Gismondi, Paglia, Sherling, M.D., P.C. v. Franco, 104 F. Supp. 2d 223 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
59. Cray v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 136 F. Supp. 2d 171 (W.D.N.Y. 2001).
60. See Cray, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 179; Franco,104 F. Supp. 2d at 233; see also Adrian N. Baker
& Co. v. Demartino, 733 S.W.2d 14, 18-19 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (enforcing covenant not to compete when discharge of employee occurred with good cause); Patterson Int'l Corp. v. Herrin, 25
Ohio Misc. 79, 85 (Oh. Ct. Comm. Pl. 1970).
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court found that the defendant was in fact terminated for cause since
he failed to turn over hospital payments to his professional corporation, failed to promote the medical practice, misappropriated billing
records, and committed a host of other acts in contravention of his
employment contract. 6 1 In Cray, the court found that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the insurance agent, an independent contractor, breached his agency agreement and was
terminated for cause by misappropriating trade secrets, engaging in
unauthorized brokering for third parties, and attempting to induce
62
policyholders to switch to different companies.
2.

The Three Middle-Ground Analyses

The majority of cases do not go as far as the New York courts in
terms of protecting employees and, by extension, the free mobility of
labor. The middle-ground cases hold that a non-compete clause is: (1)
presumptively invalid in an involuntary discharge situation; (2) invalid
if an element of bad faith in the termination is present; or (3) invalid if
the trial judge finds that equitable considerations militate against enforcement of the covenant. Adding confusion to the myriad rules developed in termination cases, one jurisdiction - Illinois - which started
out as a 'bad faith' state, but has since migrated towards a categorical
analysis, similar to that set forth in Post.
a.

Presumption Against Enforcement

The Superior Court of Pennsylvania in Insulation Corp. of America
v. Brobston63 articulated a pro-employee rule that creates a presumption against enforcing non-competition clauses in termination cases.
Brobston worked for a company called ICA, which was engaged in the
manufacture and sale of polystyrene packaging, roofing and insulation
products. 64 Brobston worked for ICA in several different capacities
before being promoted to general manager in 1990.65 In 1992, ICA
expanded its product line to include more specialized products
through the use of a computer-assisted design (CAD) system. 66 ICA
required Brobston and other employees to execute employment contracts containing restrictive covenants. 67 Shortly thereafter, Brob61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Franco, 104 F. Supp. 2d at 233.
Cray, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 176.
Insulation Corp. of Am. v. Brobston, 667 A.2d 729 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995).
Id. at 731.
Id.
Id.
Brobston, 667 A.2d at 731-32.
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ston's work performance deteriorated. 68 He failed to file sales calls
and expense reports, and only three of his fourteen accounts showed
growth. 69 The following year, ICA terminated Brobston's employment. 70 Brobston subsequently found employment with an ICA
71
competitor.
The court addressed the issue of Brobston's termination in the overall reasonableness context. In its opinion, striking the non-compete as
void, the court stated:
Where an employee is terminated by his employer on the grounds
that he has failed to promote the employer's legitimate business interests, it clearly suggests an implicit decision on the part of the employer that its business interests are best promoted without the
employee in its service. The employer who fires an employee for
failing to perform in a manner that promotes the employer's business interests deems the employee worthless. Once such a determination is made by the employer, the need to protect itself from the
former employee is diminished by the fact that the employee's
worth to the corporation is presumably insignificant. Under such
circumstances, we conclude that it is unreasonable as a matter of
law to permit the employer to retain unfettered control over that
which it has effectively
discarded as worthless to its legitimate busi72
ness interests.
Brobston suggests that a non-compete clause is presumptively invalid
when an employer terminates the employee. The court stated that
"[t]his conclusion would remain the same even if it were determined
that Brobston was legitimately terminated for economic reasons...
where an employer determines that its 'bottom-line' is best protected
without the employee on the payroll. However, it must be kept in
'73
mind that reasonableness is determined on a case-by-case basis."
It is clear that the Brobston court believed that an economically
motivated reduction-in-force would not allow an employer to enforce
a non-compete clause. 74 Along the same lines, not all terminations for
performance deficiencies, or disagreements between employer and
employee, can be classified as terminations for cause, and frequently,
employment contracts expressly define what "for cause" means. 75 Regardless, Brobston's termination, even considering his poor perform68. Id. at 732.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Brobston, 667 A.2d at 732.
72. Id. at 735.
73. Id. at 735 n.6.
74. Id.
75. See Nairn v. Bartusiak, 29 Pa. D & C.4h 373, 383 (Pa. C.P. 1995) (holding agreement
provided that covenant not to compete would be enforced if employee was terminated with
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ance, was likely not for cause. Brobston appears to hold that
terminations without cause raise a strong presumption against enforce76
ability of a non-competition covenant.
However, the court never made this perfectly clear. Apparently,
the dissent recognized their omission when Judge Del Sole stated:
"what is to prevent a salesperson, who has secretly been recruited by a
competitor, from purposely trying to be terminated rather than resigning and then working for the competitor free of the constraints of
the restrictive covenant[?]" 77 In such an extreme case, the Pennsylvania courts would likely seize upon the language in footnote 6,
which states that reasonableness is always determined on a case-bycase basis. 78 Cases of material breach of job duties, fraud, and breach
of fiduciary duty would likely fall within the court's limited reasonableness exception.
This exception did arise in Hess v. Gebhard & Co. ,79 which involved
the termination of an insurance salesman after a corporate purchase.
In that case, Gebhard, the corporate acquirer of Hoaster's insurance
business, notified Hess that his employment as a servicer of insurance
accounts would cease on December 31, 1996.80 However, Gebhard
did give Hess two options for alternative employment, for which Hess
ultimately believed he was not qualified. 81 Prior to notifying Gebhard
of his disinterest in either position, Hess negotiated with a competitor
and solicited Gebhard clients for his new firm. 82 The court noted the
Brobston ruling, but stressed that reasonableness must be determined
on a case-by-case basis. 83 Deeming it important that Hess was not
"worthless" to Gebhard, the court held that the covenant not to compete would be enforced. 84
Since Brobston makes it fairly clear that an economically motivated
discharge, such as that effectuated by a corporate purchase, would
void a non-compete, 85 it seems likely that the ruling in Hess had more
cause, but that employer's frustration with employee's work performance and inability to reach
an agreement to form a partnership did not fall within this provision; invalidating non-compete).
76. Cf. Horizons Res., Inc. v. Troy, No. CIV.A.14740, 1995 WL 761214 at *5 (Del. Ch. Dec. 21,
1995) (upholding non-compete clause, but stating "[t]his is not a case in which defendants were
fired by plaintiff and plaintiff then tried to stop them from finding other employment.").
77. Brobston, 667 A.2d at 739 (Del Sole, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 735 n.6.
79. Hess v. Gebhard & Co., 769 A.2d 1186 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001).
80. Id. at 1189.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Hess, 769 A.2d at 1192.
84. Id.
85. See Brobston, 667 A.2d at 735 n.6.
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to do with Hess' pre-termination competitive activities and his failure
to notify Gebhard that he would not accept a new position prior to the
time he solicited clients. In light of Hess, it is doubtful that Pennsylvania courts will go as far as New York courts in terms of protecting
a discharged employee. The rule of reasonableness certainly gives
courts some flexibility.
One commentator posits that the Pennsylvania cases can be read in
such a way that courts will invalidate non-competition clauses if the
reasons for involuntary discharge do not relate directly to the interests
the employer seeks to protect through the covenant. 86 Applying this
theory to practice, the limited situations in which an employer's termination relates directly to a protectable interest, such as pre-termination theft of trade secrets or solicitation of customers, almost certainly
would justify a termination for cause. As such, Brobston, as a practical matter, may be quite close to Post, which clearly conditions enforceability of a non-compete on whether the employee was
terminated for cause. In fact, Pennsylvania courts arguably may be
even more protective of employees in discharge cases, since some terminations, such as insubordination, may be for cause, but unrelated to
the employer's protectable interest. Without further interpretation of
Brobston, it remains to be seen how this rule will apply in practice.
b.

The "Bad Faith" Analysis

i. Rao v. Rao and the Illinois Cases
In Rao v. Rao,87 the Seventh Circuit, interpreting a novel issue of
Illinois law, held that an employee who is discharged without cause
and in bad faith could not be limited by a non-competition clause in
his employment contract. 88 In that case, Mohan, a thoracic and cardiovascular surgeon, was the sole owner, officer and director of a
medical service corporation. 89 Hari began working at Mohan's corporation in 1976 and signed a term employment contract, renewable
from year-to-year, which contained a non-compete clause. 90 The
agreement provided that, at the end of four years of service, Hari
would be able to purchase fifty percent of Mohan's corporation for a
86. See Kurt H. Decker, Refining Pennsylvania's Standard for Invalidating a Non-Competition
Restrictive Covenant When an Employee's Termination Is Unrelated to the Employer's Protectible

Business Interest, 104 Dick. L. Rev. 619 (Summer 2000) (addressing Pennsylvania courts' treatment of covenants in involuntary discharge cases).
87. Rao v. Rao, 718 F.2d 219 (7th Cir. 1983).
88. Id. at 224.
89. Id. at 221.
90. Id.
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nominal sum. 91 On December 21, 1979, just prior to the time that
Hari's option to become a part-owner of the business vested, Mohan
sent a letter notifying Hari of his intent to terminate the employment
relationship. 92 Hari began competing, and Mohan sued for enforcement of the non-compete clause or, in the alternative, liquidated
93
damages.
The trial court found that Hari's work performance was satisfactory,
and that he was terminated because Mohan did not want him to exercise his contractual right to obtain a fifty percent interest in the corporation. 94 The appellate court affirmed the trial court's refusal to
enforce the non-compete. 95 In so holding, the Seventh Circuit first
noted that, under Illinois law, "in every contract both parties promise
to act in good faith."' 96 With this premise established, the court stated
that "[t]he implied promise of good faith ... modifies [Mohan's] dis-

cretionary right to dismiss Hari and then to invoke the restrictive covenant." 97 The court held that Mohan could not enforce the covenant,
whether it analyzed the implied duty of good faith as an independent
contractual term, or whether a "good faith termination is a condition
precedent to the operation of the restrictive covenant. ' 98 Under either analysis, the result was the same: a bad faith termination will not
allow an employer to obtain the benefit of a restrictive covenant. 99
The court's analysis, however, was somewhat unclear. In dicta, the
court seemed to shy away from a per se rule similar to that articulated
in Post, when it stated that "[tio be sure, there are cases where an
employer dismisses an employee but the employee's inadequate per91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Rao, 718 F.2d at 221.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 222.
Rao, 718 F.2d at 222.

96. Id. (citing Osten v. Shah, 433 N.E.2d 294, 296 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982)).
97. Id. at 223. It is fairly clear that a wrongful termination, that is, one that is in breach of
contract, will relieve an employee from a restrictive covenant. See Washington County Mem'l
Hosp. v. Sidebottom, 7 S.W.3d 542, 546 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (stating that employer who materially breaches employment agreement cannot enforce restrictive covenant against employee);
Bergstein v. Tech. Solutions Co., 654 N.E.2d 479, 480-81 (I11.App. Ct. 1995) (stating that involuntary discharge roughly one year prior to expiration of term contract relieved employee from
restrictive covenant obligations); Ward v. Am. Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 443 N.E.2d 1342, 1343-44
(Mass. App. Ct. 1983) (holding that employer's breach of contract voids non-compete clause).
Additionally, if an employer breaches an employment agreement and an employee subsequently
resigns to start competing, the employer's material breach of the employment contract will serve
as a valid defense to enforcement. See Francorp, Inc. v. Siebert, 126 F. Supp. 2d 543, 547 (N.D.
Ill. 2000) (stating that former employer's failure to pay departed executives' salary for several
weeks necessitated their departure and excused them from non-compete obligations).
98. Rao, 718 F.2d at 223.
99. Id.
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formance, in fact, impelled the dismissal."' 100 In such a case, the Rao
court stated that "a restrictive covenant may be as reasonably necessary as in the cases where the employee voluntarily leaves his job."10 1
Nevertheless, the Rao court went on to state that "a restrictive covenant that can become effective when an employee is terminated without good cause is not reasonably necessary to protect an employer's
goodwill."' 0 2 Although this last statement could conceivably be interpreted as a categorical rule against enforcement, this is most likely not
what the Rao court intended, given its focus on the employer's conduct and its concern with the employee's job performance.
The Illinois Appellate Court muted the Rao bad faith analysis in
Bishop v. Lakeland Animal Hospital, P.C103 In the Bishop case,

neither party disputed the fact that the plaintiff, who had a four-year
non-competition clause in her employment contract, was terminated
without cause. The court agreed with the reasoning in Rao and held
that the implied promise of good faith inherent in every contract precluded enforcement of the non-compete clause when the employer
terminated the employee without cause. The Bishop court did not
04
mention the dicta in Rao, which cautions against a categorical rule.1
In fact, Bishop can certainly be read as setting forth such a categorical
rule, since the court states that "in order for a noncompetition clause
to be enforceable ...

the employee must have been terminated for

cause or by his own accord." 10 5
No Illinois case since Bishop has clarified this tension definitively.
However, in Francorp,Inc. v. Siebert, the court appeared to confirm

the notion that Bishop did create a per se rule along the lines of
Post.106 After first discussing the bad faith rule articulated in Rao, the
Siebert court stated that Bishop "takes the rule farther, holding that an

employer cannot enforce a noncompetition agreement against an employee who has been dismissed without cause, even if the employment
contract authorizes such termination, because firing without cause
breaches the implied covenant of good faith inherent in every con-

100. Id. at 224.
101. Id.
102. Rao, 718 F.2d at 224.
103. Bishop v. Lakeland Animal Hosp., P.C., 644 N.E.2d 33 (I11.App. Ct. 1994).
104. Id. at 34-35 (agreeing with the reasoning employed by the seventh circuit and concluding
that when the employer dismisses the employee without cause, the implied promise of good faith
that is found in every contract precludes enforcement of a noncompetition clause).
105. Id.
106. Siebert, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 546.
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tract. ' 10 7 While Illinois once appeared to be in the 'bad faith' camp, it
now advocates a pro-employee per se rule.108
However, the reasoning of the Illinois cases is curious at best.10 9
Reading Siebert's interpretation of Bishop, the Siebert court seems to
hold that any termination without cause, even if authorized by the employment contract, breaches the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing."10 This seems to constitute an almost untenable proposition, because if taken literally, it would create a cause of action for
every employee who is fired without cause, which is something that
Illinois courts have refused to hold.' What the court in Siebert may
have meant is that an employer's attempt to enforce a non-compete
clause, after discharging an employee without cause, amounts to bad
faith and, concomitantly, gives rise to an affirmative defense against
enforcement. However, it is more likely that the Siebert court tried in
vain to reconcile the bad faith language in Rao with Bishop's extension of the rule. It would have been less confusing if the court just
declared that termination without cause precludes enforcement of a
covenant not to compete, as a matter of law, for that is clearly how
Bishop reads.

ii. Other 'Bad Faith' Cases and the Employer-Focused Approach
Several other jurisdictions follow the reasoning set forth in Rao and
focus on the employer's conduct in carrying out the termination to
determine the enforceability of a covenant not to compete. For instance, the Supreme Court of Wyoming, in Hopper v. All-Pet Animal
Clinic, Inc.,112 held that "[s]imple justice requires that a termination
by the employer of an at will employee be in good faith if a covenant
not to compete is to be enforced.""13 Although finding that the employer's conduct in terminating the plaintiff was not in bad faith, the
107. Id. (emphasis added).
108. Id.
109. Cf. Woodfield Group, Inc. v. DeLisle, 693 N.E.2d 464, 469 (I11.
App. Ct. 1998) (suggesting
that employer's termination of employee may affect whether continued employment is sufficient
consideration for at-will employee's execution of non-compete clause); Simko, Inc. v. Graymar
Co., 464 A.2d 1104, 1107-08 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1983) (same).
110. Siebert, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 546. Contra Schwartz v. Fortune Magazine, 89 F. Supp. 2d 429,
434 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (holding that, under New York law, where contract permits termination
without cause, court does not inquire into claimed "bad faith" motivations for termination, but
rather determines whether party's actions in terminating the contract are consistent with termination provisions).
111. See Harrison v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 546 N.E.2d 248, 255-56 (I11.
App. Ct. 1989) (declining to give employee cause of action for breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing in at-will setting).
112. Hopper, D.V.M. v. All Pet Animal Clinic, Inc., 861 P.2d 531, 541 (Wyo. 1993).
113. Id. at 541.
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Hopper court did give an example of what conduct might militate
against enforcement of a restrictive covenant. Specifically, the Hopper court noted that a covenant might be void "if an employer hired
an employee at will, obtained a covenant not to compete, and then
terminated the employee, 'without cause, to arbitrarily restrict
14
competition."'
Both Tennessee and Mississippi follow the Wyoming approach and
judge the overall reasonableness of the covenant through consideration of the nature of the dismissal. For instance, in CentralAdjustment
Bureau, Inc. v. Ingram,1' 5 the Tennessee Supreme Court stated that
"[a]lthough an at-will employee can be discharged for any reason
without breach of contract, a discharge which is arbitrary, capricious
or in bad faith clearly has a bearing on whether a court of equity
should enforce a non-competition covenant. 11 6 The Supreme Court
of Mississippi, in Empiregas, Inc. v. Bain,117 used an identical test. 118
Similarly, Minnesota courts will not enforce restrictive covenants
against discharged employees where the employer has taken "undue
advantage" of its right to terminate, 119 or where the employer's conduct was "unconscionable" by reason of a "bad motive.' 2 0 Similar to
the court's analysis in Rao, these courts examine the employer's conduct and the motives behind the discharge, but not necessarily its effect on the employee.
Indiana courts took a similar approach in Gomez v. Chua Medical
Corp.,121 holding that "[w]here the employee is discharged in bad faith
... the covenant will not be enforced through the operation of equity. 1 22 The Gomez court reasoned that a fact-intensive inquiry into
whether an employee is discharged with or without cause would be
unduly burdensome and would detract from the central issues of a
non-compete dispute.' 23 Furthermore, the Gomez court emphasized
the freedom of parties to contract with one another and placed the
burden on the employee to decline employment if the covenant is not
24
limited in the desired manner.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id.
Central Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Ingram, 678 S.W.2d 28 (Tenn. 1984).
Id. at 35.
Empiregas, Inc. v. Bain, 599 So. 2d 971 (Miss. 1992).
Id. at 975.
Granger v. Craven, 199 N.W. 10, 14 (Minn. 1924).
Edin v. Jostens, Inc., 343 N.W.2d 691, 694 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
Gomez v. Chua Med. Corp., 510 N.E.2d 191 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987).
Id. at 194.
Id. at 195.
Id.
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Two older cases from Massachusetts and Texas employed similar
tests in refusing to enforce non-competition clauses against employees
who were discharged without cause. In both Economy Grocery Stores
Corp. v. McMenamy 125 and Security Services, Inc. v. Priest,2 6 the
courts noted that principles of equity might deny enforcement of a
restrictive covenant if the employer acts arbitrarily and unreasonably
in discharging the employee. 12 7 In Priest,the employer hired a salesperson, obtained the benefit of his client contacts and, after those contacts were "saturated," discharged the salesperson within a matter of
months. 12 8 The employer's opportunistic conduct clearly amounted to
an unreasonable exercise of its discretion to discharge the employee
while simultaneously seeking to enforce a non-compete clause. In
McMenamy, the facts indicated that the defendant, a manager at a
department store, performed his job according to expectations only to
be terminated "in circumstances involving some humiliation to
him. 1 29 In a rather significant decision, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts took into account not only the employer's conduct, but also
the employee's expectation of continuing his employment and the fact
that the employer terminated the employment relationship in the
midst of the Great Depression.1 30 A countervailing public interest
may have had some role in the court's decision.
c.

The Balancing the Equities Analysis

The McMenamy ruling suggests that factors other than just the employer's conduct should be considered before enforcing a covenant
not to compete against a discharged employee. 131 Several cases take
the lead from this Depression-era decision and employ a more flexible
balancing the equities analysis. South Dakota, Iowa and Missouri
provide examples.
South Dakota courts take a unique and flexible approach in their
analysis of covenants not to compete by making a clear distinction
125. Economy Grocery Stores Corp. v. McMenamy, 195 N.E. 747 (Mass. 1935).
126. Security Servs., Inc. v. Priest, 507 S.W.2d 592 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
127. McMenamy, 195 N.E. at 748; Priest, 507 S.W.2d at 595.
128. Priest, 507 S.W.2d at 594.
129. McMenamy, 195 N.E. at 748; see also Kroeger v. Stop & Shop Cos., Inc., 432 N.E.2d 566,
572 (Mass. App. Ct. 1982) (citing McMenamy and holding that if discharge is "inequitable,"
restrictive covenant may not be enforceable); cf. Custard Ins. Adjusters, Inc. v. Nardi, No.
CV980061967S, 2000 WL 562318, at *15-16 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 20, 2000) (finding that employer did not discharge employee in bad faith and declining to void non- compete on this
ground; considering manner in which employee was terminated, whether he was replaced by
younger worker, and personality clash with superiors).
130. McMenamy, 195 N.E. at 748-49.
131. Id.

20

DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1:1

between resignation and for cause terminations, on the one hand, and
termination without cause cases on the other. If an employee voluntarily resigns, or is fired for cause, then a court will examine only
whether the covenant is reasonable, both geographically and temporally, under the state statute governing restrictive covenants. 132 However, if an employee is fired through no fault of his own, then a court
will scrutinize whether the agreement is reasonable, by giving consideration to: (1) the extent of the restraint, including its territorial scope
and duration; (2) the nature of the business or profession involved,
including the employee's position and duties; (3) the effect of enforcement on the discharged employee; and (4) the public interest in the
employee being able to continue in that field. 133 The trial judge is
obligated to consider these factors in a termination case and balance
the competing interests to determine reasonableness. 134
Iowa courts also employ a comprehensive balancing test. In Ma &
Pa, Inc. v. Kelly, 35 the employer terminated a salesman of petroleum
products during the 1982 recession, due to a change in market conditions and an unprofitable commission arrangement. The termination
was clearly without cause. 136 The employer sued the employee after
he went to work for a competitor, where he had undercut his former
employer's bids, and obtained some of its largest customers. 37 The
Supreme Court of Iowa reversed the trial court's grant of an injunction against the employee and declined to enforce the three-year, 25mile non-compete clause. 138 The Court considered the following factors in its overall balancing test: (1) the discharge by the employer; (2)
the hardship to the employee's family if the injunction were upheld;
(3) the employee's limited skills in other fields; (4) his attempts to find
other jobs without success; (5) the fact that his employment was terminated during a recession; (6) a well-known field of potential customers
in the industry; and (7) the former employer's uncompetitive
pricing. 139

132. Id. at 519; see also S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 53-9-11 (Michie 2002) (containing maximum
time and geographic limits on restrictive covenants).
133. Central Monitoring Serv., Inc., v. Zakinski, 553 N.W.2d 513, 519 (S.D. 1996).
134. Id.
135. Ma & Pa, Inc. v. Kelly, 342 N.W.2d 500 (Iowa 1984).
136. Id. at 501.
137. Id.

138. Id. at 503.
139. Kelly, 342 N.W.2d at 502-03.
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Missouri courts relied on the well-reasoned opinion in Kelly to formulate a balancing the equities rule. In Showe-Time Video Rentals,
Inc. v. Douglas,'14 the court announced that:
[I]f a non-compete covenant is reasonable as to length of time and
size of territory, and if the evidence establishes that the covenant is
ancillary to a legitimate protectable interest of the party in whose
favor the covenant runs, the covenant will be enforced by injunction
where the party against whom it runs is the party that terminates
the
141
arrangement and begins competing against the other party.

The court also held that injunctive enforcement would be granted in
those instances where the party, in whose favor the covenant runs,
1 42
terminates the arrangement with good cause.
Nevertheless, the court did not establish a per se rule along the
same lines as Post or Bishop. Instead, the Douglas court chose to rely
on Kelly's balancing the equities approach in its affirmation of the trial
court's decision to deny injunctive relief. 143 The factors that the court
deemed important in its balancing the equities analysis were: (1) the
plaintiff's decision to terminate the agreement; (2) the availability of
numerous distributors to supply movie rentals; (3) lack of any trade
secrets; and (4) the unprofitability of the distribution arrangement to
144
the supplier prior to termination.
3. Cases Holding That Discharge Is Not a Factor to Consider
At the opposite end of the spectrum from pro-employee cases such
as Post, Brobston and Bishop lie the cases that are decidedly protective of the employer's business interests. These rare cases hold that an
involuntary discharge is not even a factor to consider when determining the enforceability of a non-competition clause.
a.

The Twenty-Four Collection, Inc. v. Keller

In The Twenty-Four Collection, Inc. v. Keller,145 the former employee (Keller), a buyer for a women's retail clothing store, was discharged by Twenty-Four Collection eighteen months after she signed a
two-year non-compete that encompassed Dade, Broward and Palm
140. Showe-Time Video Rentals,
141. Id. at 433.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 433-34.
144. Douglas, 727 S.W.2d at 434;
S.W.2d 153, 157-58 (Mo. Ct. App.
competition clause when employee

Inc. v. Douglas, 727 S.w.2d 426 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).

see also Property Tax Representatives, Inc. v. Chatam, 891
1995) (affirming trial court's denial of injunction on nonwas discharged without good cause; noting that trial court

made finding of fact that reasons for dismissal were not "for cause" when employee conducted
casual business on his own time that did not amount to conflict of interest with employer).
145. Twenty Four Collection, Inc. v. Keller, 389 So. 2d 1062 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
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Beach Counties in Florida. 14 6 A month after she was fired, Keller

went to work for 24 Collection's primary competitor, Cache, and 24
Collection brought a claim for an injunction to prevent Keller from
working for Cache. 147 The Third District Court of Appeals reversed

the trial court's order denying 24 Collection's injunction and remanded for a determination as to whether the temporal and geographic limitations of the non-compete clause were reasonable. 148
The court held that the trial judge erred in balancing the equities and

avoiding a harsh result that would have emanated from the injunction. 149 The court alluded to, but never directly confronted, the involuntary discharge, and it instead relied on a strict reading of Florida
law, which does not allow a court to consider whether the enforce-

ment of a non-compete would lead to an "unjust result.'

50

In Flor-

ida, as the Keller court's analysis suggests, as long as a covenant is

reasonably limited in time and geographic scope, it is valid.151 Since
Keller signed the non-compete, she was bound to it, regardless of how
her employment ended or whether other equitable factors in her favor
were present. 152 Florida's approach is the opposite of that taken in
South Dakota, which has a similar statute governing restrictive cove-

nants but mandates that a trial judge balance the equities when an
employee is fired without cause. 153 To date, Florida is the only jurisdiction unwilling to consider an employee's termination when judging
whether a non-compete is enforceable. 15 4
b.

A Florida Limit to Keller?

The Florida rule in Keller was eroded somewhat by a subsequent
appellate court ruling in Kupscznk v. Blasters, Inc.155 In the Kupscznk
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id. at 1062.
Id.
Id. at 1064.
Keller, 389 So. 2d at 1063.
150. Id. (citing FLA. STFAT. ANN. § 542.12(2) (West 1977) (current version at FLA. SrAT. ANN.
§ 542.33(2) (West 2002))).
151. Id.
152. Cf.Gold Coast Media, Inc. v. Meltzer, 751 So. 2d 645, 646 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)
(holding that employee's promise not to compete upon "my termination from employment or
engagement by the company" constituted promise not to compete in cases of both voluntary and
involuntary termination).
153. Central Monitoring Serv., Inc. v. Zakinski, 553 N.W.2d 521 (S.D. 1996).
154. Cf.Weber v. Tillman, 913 P.2d 84, 91-92 (Kan. 1996) (applying balancing test to determine reasonableness of non-compete's enforceability, but failing to analyze physician's involuntary discharge); General Surgery, P.A. v. Suppes, 953 P.2d 1055, 1057 (Kan. Ct. App. 1998)
(declining to enforce covenant not to compete in termination case when contract language indicated that employee must end employment before covenant could be triggered).
155. Kupscznk v. Blasters, Inc., 647 So. 2d 888 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
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case, the court addressed a claim by an employee that his former employer's reduction of his commissions constituted a breach of his employment contract, rendering the non-compete unenforceable. On the
merits, the court ruled in favor of the employer. 156 However, in dicta,
the court stated:
We recognize, however, that in rare circumstances equitable considerations could possibly render a noncompetition agreement void.
For instance, had Blasters hired Kupscznk under the same terms
and then terminated him without cause after a very short time, even
though the termination would not be wrongful under the Florida atwill employment doctrine, Blasters' conduct might be deemed unconscionable and a court of equity
would not permit its perpetua157
tion by entry of an injunction.
While this statement arguably is at odds with Keller, it appears that, to
reconcile the two cases, the employee still would bear a heavy burden
of proving unconscionability as an affirmative defense. In other
words, the issue would not be examined in the context of overall reasonableness, which Section 542.12(2) of the Florida statutes does not
permit. 158 However, Kupscznk gives employees some ability to argue
that the enforcement of a non-compete might be manifestly unjust in
the case of an involuntary termination.
Section 542.12(2), which has been interpreted to remove any discretion the trial judge may have to balance the equities, has not received
universal acclaim. In Capraro v. Lanier Business Products, Inc.,159
Justice Overton, in a dissenting opinion, took the unusual step of calling on the Florida legislature to modify or repeal Section 542.12(2), to
allow courts to use "proper equitable principles when injunctive relief
60
is sought to enforce noncompetition agreements.'
4.

Analysis

a. The Fault Inherent in the 'Cause/Without Cause' Distinction
Rao, as well as other decisions employing the bad faith analysis,
may have recognized a problem with crafting a per se rule that makes
a distinction between terminations without cause and those with
cause. Quite simply, it is extremely difficult to determine what constitutes cause for dismissal. Frequently, an employment contract will list
several categories of conduct that qualify as cause for dismissal, such
156. Id. at 891.
157. Id.
158. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 542.12(2) (West 1977) (current version at
§ 542.33(2) (West 2002)).
159. Capraro v. Lanier Bus. Prods., Inc., 466 So. 2d 212 (Fla. 1985).
160. Id. at 214 (Overton, J., dissenting).

FLA.

STAT.

ANN.
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as conviction of a felony, fraud, or insubordination. However, in the
absence of such a contractual provision, when does conduct cross the
line so as to warrant dismissal for cause? Even if a contract defines
what cause is, should courts be constrained by that definition, which
may be part of an adhesion contract, or should they adopt a more
judicially accepted definition of cause? Logically, the specific contract

language should be a consideration, but certainly not a controlling
one, since courts have historically modified the precise contract language in restrictive covenant disputes to comport with an overarching
standard or reasonableness.
Some states define "cause" under the common law, which might
give a court some guidance in applying a per se rule. In Illinois, for
instance, "cause" has been defined as "some substantial shortcoming,
recognized by law and public opinion as a good reason for termination."'1 6 1 New Mexico's definition is marginally more helpful. In Dan-

zer v. ProfessionalInsurors,Inc.,162 the court held that termination for
cause guarantees against the "whim and caprice of an employer" and
allows discharge only for legal cause, that is, "some causes inherent in

and related to qualifications of the employee or a failure to properly
'163
perform some essential aspect of the employee's job function.
Good cause would be easy to establish in cases where an employee
committed fraud, breached his fiduciary duty, or violated company
policy. 164 At the opposite end of the spectrum, economically motivated terminations, discharges resulting from a reduction-in-force and
terminations due to a personality clash, almost certainly cannot be
16 5
considered as dismissals for good cause.
161. Norman v. Bd. of Fire & Police Comm'rs of Zion, 614 N.E.2d 499, 504 (Ill. App. Ct.
1993).
162. Danzer v. Prof'l Insurors, Inc., 679 P.2d 1276 (N.M. 1984).
163. Id. at 1280-81.
164. See Superior Gearbox Co. v. Edwards, 869 S.W.2d 239, 244 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (discussing the fact that "just cause" is not a well-defined concept under Missouri law, but that it has
been held to encompass an employee's "lying, stealing, repeated absences or lateness, destruction of company property, brawling and similar infractions."); Kroeger v. Stop & Shop Cos., Inc.,
432 N.E.2d 566, 572 (Mass. App. Ct. 1982) (employee theft would constitute termination for
"cause").
165. Brooks v. Bd. of Comm'rs of CHA, No. 97 C 5166, 1998 WL 214669 at *3 (N.D. I11.Apr.
21, 1998) (reduction-in-force is fundamentally different than a termination for cause); Franks v.
Magnolia Hosp., 888 F. Supp. 1310,1313-14 (N.D. Miss. 1995) (same); Insulation Corp. of Am. v.
Brobston, 667 A.2d 729, 735 n.6 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) (noting that economically motivated discharge would void non-compete). But cf. Custard Ins. Adjusters, Inc. v. Nardi,
No.CV980061967S, 2000 WL 562318 at *15-16 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 20, 2000) (noting employee's personality clash with former employer, but declining to release employee from noncompete).
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The toughest cases to clarify in the for cause/without cause spectrum are those where an employer claims that the employee's performance was inadequate. Rao suggests that inadequate performance
does rise to the level of termination for cause and that an employee's
dismissal on this basis may not relieve him of an otherwise valid noncompete obligation. 166 Conversely, Brobston, and even the dissenting
opinion in that case, implies that a performance-based termination,
short of insubordination or breach of a fiduciary duty, does not rise to
167
the level of cause.
In the final analysis, the mere labeling of a discharge as for cause or
without cause cannot control. Without question, it is a factor for the
court to examine, but crafting a rule on this basis seems unworkable
and would lead to an inquisition into the discharged employee's job
performance and whether it rises to the level of good cause for
dismissal. A collateral inquiry into past job performance is not the
most efficient way of resolving disputes involving restrictive covenants, because the vast majority of such cases need to be dealt with on
emergency injunction hearings. 168 Since the parties only have the
benefit of limited, expedited discovery, the hearings must focus on the
interests of the employer, the employee and the public in determining
whether the covenant should be enforced.
b. Florida's Anomaly
Florida's approach, as stated in Justice Overton's dissenting opinion
in Capraro, seems unduly restrictive of competition, could yield potentially inequitable results, and provides no judicial check on abusive
practices by employers who extract non-competes from their employees. Rather, Florida's test should be considered an anomaly, the
product of a statute that removes all of the trial judge's discretion to
consider notions of equity in deciding whether to enforce a covenant
not to compete. By its very nature, the test is antithetical to any injunction proceeding.
c. The Flaw of the Conduct-Driven 'Bad Faith' Rule
Although both per se rules are too inflexible, the bad faith analysis
is far from perfect. The most troubling aspect of the bad faith test is
the courts' single-handed focus on the employer's conduct in effectuating the termination, without regard for its impact on the employee
166. Rao v. Rao, 718 F.2d 219, 224 (7th Cir. 1983).
167. Brobston, 667 A.2d at 735, 739 (Del Sole, J., dissenting).
168. See Gomez v. Chua Med. Corp., 510 N.E.2d 191, 195 (noting how inquiry into reason for
termination does not fit with role courts should play in enforcing non-compete clauses).
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or the public interest. Rao presents a rather classic situation in which
the employer had a bad motive for terminating the employee preventing the employee from obtaining an equitable interest in the
business that the employee had indisputably earned. 169 However, it is
fair to say that an employer's ill motive or bad faith does not control
many terminations.
In the more straightforward termination, are other elements, such
as the effect of the termination on the worker or the presence of an
overriding public interest, to be considered? The answer is not particularly clear in bad faith jurisdictions, but case law suggests that the
courts are willing to step outside the restraints of the bad faith analysis
and consider other factors, even if they do not acknowledge that such
factors are part of a governing test. The 1935 McMenamy decision,
which purports to apply a derivative of the bad faith approach, suggests that courts should examine factors other than the employer's
170
conduct or underlying motive.
d. The Soundness of the 'Balancing the Equities' Approach
The balancing the equities approach is a logical extension of what
considerations the McMenamy court took into account. The balancing
the equities test solves the fundamental flaw of the Rao analysis; all
equitable factors, not just an employer's conduct, warrant scrutiny in
determining the enforceability of a restrictive covenant in a termination case. The decisions in Kelly and Douglas provide examples of
how courts have used a flexible balancing test to achieve a just result.
The balancing the equities approach allows a trial judge to analyze a
host of factors, some of which are likely to be unique to individual
cases. In terms of the employer's interests, the most likely factors that
171
a court will consider are: (1) the strength of the protectable interest;
a73
(2) the reason for the termination; 172 (3) the nature of the business;
(4) the protections through a less restrictive non-solicitation or nondisclosure covenant; 174 and (5) whether the discharge was conducted
75
in bad faith.'
With respect to the employee's interests, the hardship resulting
from enforcement is a primary consideration. Courts will presumably
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Rao, 718 F.2d 219 at 221.
Economy Grocery Stores Corp. v. McMenamy, 195 N.E. 747, 748-49 (Mass. 1935).
Showe-Time Video Rentals, Inc. v. Douglas, 727 S.W.2d 426, 434 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
Brobston, 667 A.2d at 734-35.
Douglas, 727 S.W.2d at 434.
Brobston, 667 A.2d at 735.
Rao v. Rao, 718 F.2d 219, 223 (7th Cir. 1983).
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take into account the employee's skills, tenure with the employer, ed-

ucation level, and experience in other fields of work. 176 Other secondary factors, if applicable, may also need to be considered, such as the
employee's opportunities, if any, to negotiate the terms of the employ178
ment contract 177 and any other available job opportunities.

Lastly, certain public interests need to be considered. Two primary
public interests that should influence a trial judge's decision are the
economic climate that is prevailing at the time of discharge 179 and
whether the community would be deprived of the employee's unique

services, such as whether a comparable professional can replace the
180
employee.
The main advantages of the balancing the equities approach are its
flexibility and the fact that it gives the trial judge discretion to consider factors unique to each case. Given the myriad situations in
which non-compete disputes arise, the balancing the equities test permits courts to adapt their analysis to account for all relevant factors,
18 1
which the per se rules and the bad faith test do not.

176. Ma & Pa, Inc. v. Kelly, 342 N.W.2d 500, 502-03 (Iowa 1984); see also Philip G. Johnson &
Co. v. Salmen, 317 N.W.2d 900, 904 (Neb. 1982) (noting that considerations in evaluating reasonableness include, inter alia, "the covenantor's training, health, education and needs of his
family.").
177. See Weseley Software Dev. v. Burdette, 977 F. Supp. 137, 141 (D. Conn. 1997) (noting
employee's opportunity to suggest changes to employment contract); Salmen, 317 N.W.2d at 904
(considering "degree of inequality of bargaining power").
178. Kelly, 342 N.W.2d at 502-03.
179. See id. (noting that employee was discharged during the 1982 recession); Salmen, 317
N.W.2d at 904; McMenamy, 195 N.E. at 748-49.
180. See Iredell Digestive Disease Clinic, P.A. v. Petrozza, 373 S.E.2d 449, 455 (N.C. Ct. App.
1988) (declining to enforce covenant not to compete on basis of public interest in receiving
choices in adequate, affordable health care), affd, 377 S.E.2d 750 (N.C. 1989).
181. The author respectfully disagrees with the conclusion set forth in an article addressing
the same subject, which advocates a uniform approach in analyzing non-competition covenants,
regardless of how the relationship ended. See Andrew J. Gallo, Comment, A Uniform Rule for
Enforcement of Non-Competition Contracts in Relation to Termination Cases, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. &
EMP. L. 719 (Fall 1998). Specifically, this article advocates that the Florida rule is the most
sound, and it reasons "the method of termination" has "no direct bearing upon the separate
exchange that is the subject of the non-competition clause." Id. at 741-42. As a practical matter,
it is only in the rarest of cases that an employee - either prospective or existing - has enough
leverage to negotiate, modify or remove a restrictive covenant from an employment contract
presented to her. Therefore, it is highly unusual for employer and employee to have a "separate
exchange" for a restrictive covenant. If the employer and employee do bargain separately for
the covenant, then this may be a factor for a court to consider. However, to remove such a key
element from a reasonableness analysis ignores not only the historical function of chancery
courts to consider all equitable considerations before fashioning injunctive relief, but also the
unique facts and circumstances inherent in restrictive covenant disputes.
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B. Non-Solicitation Clauses
Customer non-solicitation clauses are far less restrictive of competition than traditional non-competes. They represent the classic form of
an activity restraint and, in theory, should be narrowly tailored to protect client relationships. Nevertheless, the presence of a non-solicit
clause in a former employee's contract is a significant deterrent for
that worker in his efforts to find a new job. For many salespersons,
the extent of their contacts and ability to bring in a book of business
to their new job is of paramount importance, not only for getting
hired, but also for attaining an incentive compensation level commensurate with their experience. Given these business realities, how
should non-solicitation clauses be judged in involuntary discharge
cases?
Only two states have addressed the question of whether a customer
non-solicitation clause is affected by an employee's involuntary discharge. Adding to the lack of clarity emanating from non-competition
cases, the decisions reach opposite results. Missouri courts have determined that otherwise enforceable non-solicit clauses remain valid
in a termination case, while New York courts hold that they do not.
1. The Chatam Rule - Covenant Enforceable
In Property Tax Representatives, Inc. v. Chatam,182 the Missouri
Court of Appeals addressed whether a non-competition clause and a
non-solicitation clause are enforceable against an employee who is
terminated without cause. 183 The trial court in Chatham, following
the rule established in Douglas, held that both restrictive covenants
were unenforceable. 184 On appeal, the court reversed the trial court's
decision and upheld the non-solicitation covenant. 185 In noting that

the "non-solicitation provision of the contract stands on different footing than the non-competition provision," the court held that it was
"perfectly fair" to prevent the employee from exploiting, for his own
benefit and the employer's detriment, the customer contacts, goodwill,
and his knowledge of the clients' business. 186 The Chatam decision
clearly separates non-competition clauses from other activity-based
restrictive covenants.
182. Property Tax Representatives, Inc. v. Chatam, 891 S.W.2d 153 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995).
183. Id. at 155.
184. Id. at 157-58.
185. Id. at 158.
186. Chatham, 891 S.W2d at 158; see also American Pamcor, Inc. v. Klote, 438 S.W.2d 287,
291 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969) (enforcing customer non-solicitation covenant after employee was discharged in "reduction-in-force").

20021
2.

RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS
The UFG InternationalRule - Covenant Unenforceable

In stark contrast to Chatarn is the New York Bankruptcy Court's
decision in In re UFG International, Inc.187 In UFG, a Chapter 11
trustee brought an adversary proceeding against former employees,
claiming violations of customer non-solicitation provisions in their
employment contracts. 188 Relying on the Post decision, the court
stated:
These cases (Post and the cases following it) involved even greater
restrictions on employee mobility than do the covenants that the
plaintiff seeks to enforce in this case. In each of the foregoing cases,
the covenant at issue would have prevented the employee from engaging for a period of time in any work of the type that had been
done for the employer, while in this case the covenants merely forbade the solicitation of UFG's customers for a period of time.
Nonetheless, the same rule should apply. The cases, which hold that
a covenant not to compete is unenforceable against an employee
who is terminated without cause, are premised on the unfairness of
permitting an employer who has destroyed the mutuality of obligation on which the covenant rests to benefit from the covenant. [Citing Post]. The same reasoningapplies even when the covenant does
not entirely restrict the employee's mobility, but restricts him only
from dealing with certain customers. Regardless of the scope of the
restrictive covenant, an employer cannot hobble his employee by
terminating him without cause and then enforcing a restriction
that
189
diminishes his ability to find comparable employment.
New York, by virtue of Post and UFG, is the most pro-employee state
in terms of invalidating restrictive covenants in discharge cases. The
court in UFG recognized that a customer non-solicitation covenant
can be tantamount to a non-compete and can effectively shut a worker
out of prospective job opportunities. 90 The UFG court appeared to
focus not on the precise type of restrictive covenant at issue, but
rather: (1) the restriction on employee mobility; (2) the employer's
unilateral decision to discharge the employee without cause; and (3)
the inherent unfairness of first firing someone and then attempting to
enforce a restrictive covenant.' 91
C. Non-Disclosure Clauses
Covenants restricting the disclosure of trade secrets and confidential information should be enforced, regardless of how the employ187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

In re UFG Int'l, Inc., 225 B.R. 51 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
Id. at 52-53.
Id. at 56 (emphasis added).
Id.
UFG, 225 B.R. at 56.
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ment relationship ends. The court in Brobston, one of the strongest
pro-employee decisions, upheld a non-disclosure covenant in the context of an involuntary discharge without cause. 192 Since employees
have a common law duty not to disclose confidential information of a
former employer, 193 and can be sued under a trade secret misappropriation theory, the enforceability of non-disclosure covenants almost
certainly will not depend on the method or manner of termination.
D.

Other Issues in the Termination Context

Although the vast majority of employment relationships end either
in resignation by the employee or termination by the employer, certain changes in an employee's status do not necessarily fit into either
of those categories. For example, an employee may have a term contract for a number of years and, at the end of the contract period, the
parties simply decline to renew it. Is the employee bound by a restrictive covenant contained in the expired agreement? Additionally, an
employee may claim that she was constructively discharged, in that
she felt that the working conditions were so intolerable that anyone
would feel forced to resign. How should a constructive discharge be
analyzed if an employee seeks to compete with her former employer?
Finally, an employer may sell the business to a corporate purchaser,
one for whom the employee had no expectation of rendering services.
In the context of a small, closely-held business, the change of control
can have significant repercussions within the employee ranks. Is the
restrictive covenant assignable? For all of these potential fact-patterns, courts have come up with some unique, and divergent, analyses.
1. Expiration of Contract Term/Nonrenewal
Although most employees have at-will status, so that the employment relationship can be terminated at any time, with or without
cause, certain employees have term contracts. These agreements set
the number of years that the parties are obligated to continue the employment relationship. Frequently, these contracts contain 'rollover'
clauses, which provide for automatic renewal of the agreement from
192. Insulation Corp. of Am. v. Brobston, 667 A.2d 729, 737-38 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994).
193. Anderson Chem. Co. v. Green, 66 S.W.3d 434, 442 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001) (stating that
while a former employee may use general skills, knowledge and experiences acquired during
employment, a former employee may not use trade secrets or other confidential information
acquired during employment); Ed Nowogroski Ins., Inc. v. Rucker, 971 P.2d 936, 941-42 (Wash.
1999) (discussing how even without an enforceable non-compete covenant, a former employee
still remains under a duty not to use or disclose, to the harm of his former employer, trade
secrets acquired during employment).
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year-to-year, unless one party provides notice of its intent not to renew in advance of the contract's expiration date.
Reported case law has given relatively little attention to whether a
covenant not to compete is enforceable if the employee's term contract simply lapses or expires. In such a situation, neither party affirmatively terminates the agreement; rather, when the term comes to
an end, the parties walk away from the relationship. Is the restrictive
covenant enforceable, or is the employee free to work in whatever
capacity she chooses? An employer could argue that it bargained for
the covenant, regardless of how the employment relationship ended,
and that it should be enforced even if no premature termination occurs. On the other hand, the employee could argue that the covenant
applies only to an early parting of the ways, whether at the behest of
the employee or employer, and does not apply when the contract term
expires. As can be gleaned from the case law, the results of covenant
disputes in nonrenewal cases turn on the issue of contract
construction.
a.

Expansive Reading of Contract - The Daniel Boone Clinic

In The Daniel Boone Clinic, P.S.C. v. Dahhan,194 a medical clinic
hired Dahhan for a term of eighteen months and provided for a covenant not to compete for a commensurate period "following the termination of employment." 195 At the end of the contract term, the clinic
declined to renew Dahhan's contract, and he immediately opened an
office for the private practice of medicine within the covenant's restricted territory. 196 The clinic filed a claim for injunctive -relief
against Dahhan to enforce the 18-month covenant not to compete in
his expired employment contract. 197 The court rejected Dahhan's argument that, since his contract was not "terminated" by the clinic, the
1 98
plain meaning of the contract did not preclude him from competing.
The court reasoned that, "termination means ending, however accomplished," and that an affirmative act of either party or its expiration
199
could end a contract.

194. The Daniel Boone Clinic, P.S.C. v. Dahhan, 734 S.W.2d 488 (Ky. Ct. App. 1987).
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

Id. at 489.
Id. at 490.
Id.
The Daniel Boone Clinic, 734 S.W.2d at 490.
Id.
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b. Narrow Reading of Contract - Clinch Valley Physicians
The Supreme Court of Virginia reached virtually the opposite result
2 00 In the Clinch Valley
in Clinch Valley Physicians, Inc. v. Garcia.
case, Garcia signed an employment agreement with his physician
shareholder group for a term of one year, which was to continue from
year-to-year unless either party gave its intent not to renew within
thirty days of expiration. 20 1 The contract also contained a covenant
not to compete, which stated that, "Upon termination of this agreement, for any reasons whatsoever, [Garcia] shall not, for a period of
three (3) years thereafter, engage in the practice of medicine or surgery in a radius of twenty-five (25) miles of Richlands. ''20 2 The physician group notified Garcia that it would not renew his employment
contract. 20 3 Garcia filed a declaratory judgment action seeking to de20 4
termine the enforceability of the contract's non-competition clause.
The Court noted that the non-compete was intended to go into effect
'20 5
upon termination of the agreement "for any reasons whatsoever.
However, the court held that the non-compete did not become effective upon the parties' failure to renew the contract. 20 6 Instead, the
Court examined other provisions of the employment agreement and
found that the physician group could not terminate Garcia for reasons
other than cause, prior to the expiration of the contract. 20 7 Construing the language of these provisions with the termination language in
the non-compete provision, the Clinch Valley court found that application of the restrictive covenant was limited to terminations for cause,
20 8
even if this is not what the physician group had intended.
The Daniel Boone Clinic and Clinch Valley are difficult to reconcile,
and the decisions provide an example of what can happen when courts
fail to articulate an overriding principle and instead rely on principles
of contract construction. Arguably, Garcia's agreement was much
clearer, since the covenant not to compete was to be enforced on "termination ... for any reasons whatsoever." However, the Clinch Valley
court held that the language was not applicable in the context of con200. Clinch Valley Physicians, Inc. v. Garcia, 414 S.E.2d 599 (Va. 1992).
201. Id. at 600.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Clinch Valley, 414 S.E.2d at 601.
205. Id.
206. Id. (stating that the Court is limited to the language of the contract and that CVP should
have said stated its intentions in explicit terms if it had desired to make the restrictive covenant
applicable upon renewal).
207. Id.
208. Clinch Valley, 414 S.E.2d at 601.
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tract non-renewals, ultimately ruling in favor of the employee. 20 9 In
The Daniel Boone Clinic, despite the fact that the agreement only

mentioned "termination," the court broadly interpreted the contract
and held that the restrictive covenant was operative even upon expira-

tion of the contract term.210 The results are tough to square.
c. Florida's Rule - "Expiration" Must Be Clearly Included
Florida, which is often regarded as the most pro-employer state in
terms of restrictive covenant enforcement, takes a more employee
friendly approach in its nonrenewal cases; 'expiration' must be mentioned in the contract as a non-compete trigger. In Brenner v. Barco
Chem. Div., Inc.,211 the Florida District Court of Appeals held that a

non-compete provision survived the expiration of an employment
agreement, where it expressly provided that its terms would continue

after expiration if the employee continued to work without renewing
the contract, and where the non-compete clause would continue following "expiration or termination" of the employment. 212 Florida
courts held in both Sanz v. R. T. Aerospace Corp.2 13 and Storz Broadcasting Co. v. Courtney,2 14 that a non-compete was unenforceable in a

written, fully performed and expired employment agreement, since
the covenants were only applicable if the employee terminated employment during the life of the contract. 21 5 Florida clearly does not
prohibit the enforcement of non-competes following the expiration of
a term contract as a per se rule, but the issue is one of contract drafting and whether the covenant not to compete clearly takes effect upon
2 16
expiration of the contract.

209. Id.
210. The Daniel Boone Clinic, P.S.C. v. Dahhan, 734 S.W.2d 488, 490 (Ky. Ct. App. 1987); see
also Robert S. Weiss & Assocs., Inc. v. Wiederlight, 546 A.2d 216, 222 (Conn. 1988) (upholding
enforcement of non-compete after lapse of four-year employment term contract which was not
renewed by employer, on grounds that "terminated" includes "lapse or expiration"); cf. Volunteer Firemen's Ins. Servs., Inc. v. CIGNA Prop. & Cas. Ins. Agency, 693 A.2d 1330, 1339-40 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1997) (upholding restrictive covenants in agreement between distributor of insurance
services and underwriter when distributor gave intent not to renew "rollover" term contract;
finding that "termination" included "expiration" of contract term); Carvel Corp. v. Eisenberg,
692 F. Supp. 182, 184-85 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (upholding non-compete clause in licensing agreement
on same grounds).
211. Brenner v. Barco Chem. Div., Inc., 209 So. 2d 277, 278 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
212. Id.
213. Sanz v. R.T. Aerospace Corp., 650 So. 2d 1057 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
214. Storz Broad. Co. v. Courtney, 178 So. 2d 40 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965), cert. denied, 188
So. 2d 315 (Fla. 1966).
215. Sanz, 650 So. 2d at 1059; Courtney, 178 So. 2d at 42.
216. See also Karlin v. Weinberg, 390 A.2d 1161, 1165 n.2 (N.J. 1978) (agreeing with state
appellate court that post-employment restrictive covenant was not terminated by expiration of
contract).
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Analysis

The enforceability of non-competition clauses in expired term contracts has become one of judicial contract construction. If courts continue to analyze cases in this manner, Florida's approach, which
requires 'expiration' to be articulated conspicuously in the contract, is
the most logical because it provides the employee with notice of what
events will trigger the covenant. From a reasonableness standpoint, it
makes far greater sense for courts to analyze which party declined to
renew the term contract. Logically, the employee wanted to keep
working, but the employer chose not to renew the agreement, this
should be equated to termination without cause and regarded as a
factor strongly favoring the employee in a balancing the equities inquiry. Such an analysis would have changed the outcome in The
DanielBoone Clinic, since the employer elected not to renew the rollover term contract. On the other hand, if the employee gave the employer notice of his intent not to renew the term contract, this would
be more akin to a voluntary resignation, particularly if the employee
had, in the past, renewed the contract as a matter of course.
A second, but more tenuous, argument that the employee may have
concerns the ancillarity doctrine. If an employment contract lapses or
expires, then a covenant not to compete purporting to take effect
upon expiration of the agreement could be considered as not ancillary
to a valid transaction. Put another way, a court may consider that a
covenant amounts to a "naked" covenant, or an outright restraint of
trade, which is per se invalid. 217 If both parties to a term contract
bargain for a definite end of the employment relationship, then a noncompete that takes effect after a predetermined end to the contract is
not ancillary to a valid relationship or transaction. Conversely, in the
at-will setting, neither party bargains for a definite end to the employment relationship, and the restrictive covenant is intended to protect
the employer from a premature, not predestined, end to the relationship. Apparently, no court has addressed the ancillarity doctrine in
this context.
2.

Constructive Discharge

A claim of constructive discharge normally arises out
ment discrimination or harassment case. In such cases,
charges that her former employer behaved in a manner
work environment so intolerable or unbearable that she

of an employthe employee
that made the
had no choice

217. Central Water Works Supply, Inc. v. Fisher, 608 N.E.2d 618, 625 (I11.App. Ct. 1993)
(Cook, J., specially concurring).
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but to quit - that in effect, she was discharged.2 18 Quite simply, if an
employee proves that she was constructively terminated, the separation is a 'hybrid' termination-resignation and most likely a termination
without cause. In certain states, such as New York and Illinois, the
classification of a termination as one without cause can be outcomedeterminative and effectively void a non-compete.
a.

The Curious Alliance Metals Decision

Due to the fact that most terminations are easily classified as resignations or terminations, this issue has not appeared with great frequency in reported decisions concerning restrictive covenants.
However, the issue of constructive discharge was prevalent in Alliance
Metals, Inc. of Atlanta v. Hinely Indus., Inc.2 19 In the Alliance Metals
case, Hinely had a five-year employment contract, which included a
two-year non-compete provision, to serve as President of a whollyowned subsidiary of Alliance Metals.22 0 Hinely became disenchanted
with his employment almost immediately. 2 2 1 During the first year of
his employment, Hinely did not receive any incentive compensation,
due to the company's alleged poor financial performance, and he suspected that his superiors at the parent company had manipulated the
books to deny him such compensation.2 2 2 Hinely also suspected that
the chairman of the parent company was engaged in a price-fixing
scheme with a competitor.2 2 3 Hinely began cooperating with the Department of Justice and, shortly thereafter, was stripped of his day-today duties at the company. 224 Ten days after Hinely was effectively
put on paid leave, the chairman of the parent company admitted to
violating the Sherman Act, thereby confirming Hinely's suspicions. 225
Hinely then formally resigned from Alliance Metals, stating that the
company's actions had, in effect, amounted to a "constructive discharge" of his term contract. 226 Hinely immediately incorporated his
own competing entity, and Alliance Metals sued him for, inter alia,
227
breach of the employment contract.
218. See Rosado v. Santiago, 562 F.2d 114, 119 (1st Cir. 1977) (setting forth constructive discharge standard); Green v. Indus. Specialty Contractors, Inc., 1 S.W.3d 126, 134 (Tex. Ct. App.
1999) (same).
219. Alliance Metals, Inc. of Atlanta v. Hinely Indus., Inc., 222 F.3d 895 (11th Cir. 2000).
220. Id. at 897.
221. Id. at 898.
222. Id.
223. Alliance Metals, 222 F.3d at 898.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Alliance Metals, 222 F.3d at 899.
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Hinely defended the lawsuit on the grounds that he was constructively discharged, and that the non-compete was void, by its own
terms, because Alliance had effectively terminated him without
cause. 228 The court examined the language in Hinely's contract, which
provided that the restrictive covenant:
[Sihall be null and void in the event Employee is terminated by Employer without cause or if the Employer materially breaches the
terms of this agreement and fails to cure any such material breach
within thirty (30) days after notice from229the Employee specifying
the breach and requiring it to be cured.
The contract also provided for the application of Pennsylvania law,
which, given the holding in Brobston, would seemingly permit Hinely
to void the non-compete if he could prove his constructive discharge
claim at trial. However, the court held that Hinely's allegations of
constructive discharge would not, even if proven, constitute a termination by the Employer without cause, so as to render the non-compete
230
null and void.
The Alliance Metals court's reasoning strains credulity in light of the
fact that Pennsylvania law applied to Hinely's restrictive covenant.
First, the court simply could have held that Hinely failed to comply
with the 'notice and opportunity to cure breach' provision of the contract and declined to address the constructive discharge issue.23 ' Second, the court could have affirmed the district court's decision on the
grounds that Hinely failed to meet the rigorous standard of proving
constructive discharge, which required him to produce enough evidence "from which a reasonable finder of fact could conclude that his
working conditions were so intolerable that a reasonable person in his
position would be compelled to resign. '2 32 Instead, the court chose to
examine the question of whether a constructive discharge constituted
a termination without cause. The court placed significant value on the
words "by employer" in the non-compete provision. 233 According to
the Eleventh Circuit, this language "contemplate[d] a conscious
choice by Alliance Atlanta to terminate Hinely without cause in order
to free him of his contractual duty not to compete. '234 The key words
"by employer" before "without cause" foreclosed an "unintentional
invalidation of the non-competition provision that could result from a
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

Id. at 899-900.
Id. at 902 (emphasis
Id. at 903.
Alliance Metals, 222
Highhouse v. Avery
Alliance Metals, 222
Id.

added).
F.3d at 903.
Transp., 660 A.2d 1374, 1376 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995).
F.3d at 902.
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constructive discharge. 2 35 Accordingly, Hinely could not equate constructive discharge with termination "by [the] employer" without
cause.

236

In light of Brobston, which raises a strong presumption against the
enforceability of a non-compete in a termination case, 237 the Alliance
Metals case produced a strange outcome, to say the least. For example, the court never even cited Brobston or analogized a constructive
discharge to a termination without cause. Although the parameters of
the Brobston holding are not well-defined, that case does state clearly
that it should make no difference whether there is specific contractual
language allowing an employer to enforce a restrictive covenant in a
discharge case.238 In fact, the employment contract at issue in the
Brobston case, similar to most employment contracts, provides that
the non-compete is enforceable "[o]n the termination of Employee's
employment for whatever reason . . .",239 According to the Alliance
Metals court, the relevant inquiry is not the reasonableness of enforcing a restrictive covenant against a discharged worker; rather the sole
inquiry is the contract's language and whether it allows for enforcement in such as case.240 If the court explored the enforceability of the
covenant under Brobston, and if Hinely were able to prove that he
was constructively discharged, Hinely most likely could have voided
the non-compete. It is difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile Alliance
Metals with Brobston; perhaps the Eleventh Circuit thought it was applying Florida law.
b. The Narrow Contract Reading in Key Temporary Personnel
The Oklahoma appellate court reached a similar result in Key Temporary Personnel,Inc. v. Cox. 241 In the Cox case, the court held that
an employee's claim of "constructive discharge" was not a defense to
the enforceability of a customer non-solicitation clause. 242 The court
chose to rely on a strict contract construction approach, rather than
analyzing the case under an overall requirement of reasonableness. In
Cox, the employee's non-solicitation clause took effect if her employment ceased for any reason, without regard for the nature of her termination or even whether a breach of the agreement caused the end
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.

Id.
Id. at 903.
See supra, Section III.A.2.a.
Insulation Corp. of Am. v. Brobston, 667 A.2d 729, 731-32 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995).
Id. at 731-32 (emphasis added).
Alliance Metals, 222 F.3d at 902.
Key Temp. Personnel, Inc. v. Cox, 884 P.2d 1213 (Okla. Ct. App. 1994).
Id. at 1217.
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of the employment relationship. In rejecting Cox's defense, the court
placed emphasis on the fact that, "it was Cox herself, that [sic] terminated her employment with Key. '243 Additionally, the court emphasized that Cox could not point to any contractual language that would
allow her to escape the non-solicitation restriction if the work conditions were intolerable. 244 The court gave no credence to the fact that
a constructive discharge is akin to a termination without cause, or that
fairness and reasonableness may militate against enforcement of the
restrictive covenant in such cases.2 45
c.

Analysis

Viewing Alliance Metals as an anomaly, and Cox as simply a poorly
reasoned decision, the constructive discharge analysis should almost
always parallel the termination without cause analysis. If a state's restrictive covenant law provides that a termination without cause voids
a non-compete, then an employee's claim that he was constructively
discharged should give him an opportunity to void the non-compete
clause. 246 A case following this approach is International Business
Machines Corp. v. Martson.2 4 7 In that case, which addressed an employee's forfeiture of benefits for violating a restrictive covenant, a
federal district court in New York granted an employee leave to
amend his answer so that he could raise the issue of constructive discharge in his efforts to avoid the covenant not to compete. 24 8 The
court recognized that, under New York law, a termination without
cause automatically voids a non-compete clause, and that constructive
discharge is for all intents and purposes a termination without
249
cause.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. The decision is also somewhat unusual since Oklahoma is a pro-employee state, and the
governing statute permits non-competition clauses in only two circumstances: sale of goodwill
and dissolution of a partnership. See Loewen Group Acquisition Corp. v. Matthews, 12 P.3d
977, 980 (Okla. Ct. App. 2000) (voiding covenant not to compete in connection with business
purchase; citing two statutory exceptions to prohibition on restraints of trade).
246. Cf. Tennyson v. Sch. Dist of Menomonie Area., 606 N.W.2d 594, 602 (Wis. Ct. App.
1999) (employee had claim for breach of contract, which employer could only terminate "for
cause,"; constructively discharged); Guiliano v. Cleo, Inc., 995 S.W.2d 88, 95-96 (Tenn. 1999)
(employer breached employment contract providing that executive could be terminated only
"for cause" when it removed duties and constructively discharged him); Turner v. AnheuserBusch, Inc., 876 P.2d 1022, 1030 (Cal. 1994) (stating that "[a]n employee may prove ... that a
constructive discharge is a breach of an express or implied contract of employment.").
247. International Bus. Machs. Corp. v. Martson, 37 F. Supp. 2d 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
248. Id. at 619-21.
249. Post v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 397 N.E.2d 358, 360-61 (N.Y. 1979).
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3. Assignment of Contract to New Employer
Many employees accept positions with companies based on their
relationship with, and regard for, a management team that is in place
at the time of hiring. Indeed, most employees devote little thought to
succession planning and whether current management is looking to
sell the business to a new owner. When a business is sold, however,
the employee and acquiring corporation may have different expectations with respect to workforce stability. First, the employee may believe, especially in a closely-held company, that a sale of the business
fundamentally alters the nature of the employment relationship, so
that it is reasonable for her to examine other competitive job opportunities. Second, the acquiring corporation likely has conducted due diligence to determine whether the current sales or information
technology staff is bound by restrictive covenants. The presence of
strong covenants not to compete can dramatically affect the goodwill
component of a business and can help ensure that new management
will have a strong staff of key employees to effectuate the transition.
This tension is almost always resolved in the acquiring corporation's
favor. Most well-drafted employment contracts contain an assignability clause, which permits an employer to assign a restrictive covenant
in a business sale. The general rule is that, if a contract expressly permits a party to assign its rights under the contract, the assignee (the
acquiring corporation) may enforce the agreement and any restrictive
250
covenants contained therein.
In the absence of an assignability clause, the authorities are split.
Virtually all jurisdictions, including the employee-friendly states of Illinois and New York, have held that an assignment of a restrictive
covenant to an acquiring corporation is permissible in the absence of a
governing contractual clause.2 51 However, Pennsylvania has held that,
absent a specific contractual provision, restrictive covenants are not
assignable to an acquiring corporation. 252
250. Barnes Group, Inc. v. Reinhart, No. TH 00-311-CTH, 2001 WL 301433 at *21 (S.D. Ind.
Feb. 26, 2001); Hamer Holding Group, Inc. v. Elmore, 560 N.E.2d 907, 913 (I11.App. Ct. 1990).
251. AutoMed Techs., Inc. v. Eller, 160 F. Supp. 2d 915, 923-24 (N.D. Ill. 2001); Artromick
Int'l, Inc. v. Koch, 759 N.E.2d 385, 386-88 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001); Managed Health Care Assocs.,
Inc. v. Kethan, 209 F.3d 923, 929 (6th Cir. 2000); J. H. Renarde, Inc. v. Sims, 711 A.2d 410, 413
(N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1998); Hexacomb Corp. v. GTW Enters., 875 F. Supp. 457, 464 (N.D.
Ill. 1993); Herring Gas Co., Inc. v. Whiddon, 616 So. 2d 892, 896-97 (Miss. 1993); Special Prods.
Mfg., Inc. v. Douglass, 553 N.Y.S.2d 506, 509 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990); Saliterman v. Finney, 361
N.W.2d 175, 178 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
252. Siemens Med. Solutions Health Servs. Corp. v. Carmelengo, 167 F. Supp. 2d 752, 757-58
(E.D. Pa. 2001).

40

DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1:1

If an employee is genuinely concerned about a management buyout, he can always attempt to contract around the assignability clause
by providing that a change of control will relieve him from the restrictive covenant. However, many employers realize that the goodwill
value of the business, and concomitantly, the purchase price, will be
significantly reduced if there is a threat of post-employment competition and customer raiding by key employees. Therefore, unless a valued prospective employee has true bargaining power, it is unlikely
that he will be able to contract around assignability.
IV.

PRACTICAL ADVICE FOR AVOIDING LEGAL DISPUTES

Given the myriad rules and tests that courts have employed in discharge cases, it is far more efficient for the employer and employee to
address the enforceability of a restrictive covenant in the event of involuntary termination through a clear, well-drafted agreement. The
ideal approach to define the parties' rights, obligations, and more importantly, avoid litigation, is to draft an employment agreement that
addresses the enforceability of a covenant upon termination. Alternatively, if the employer seeks to discharge the employee, but fails to
secure a non-compete, or the employment contract does not specifically address involuntary discharge with respect to the covenant, then
the parties should provide for a brand new covenant, if desired, in a
separation agreement.
A.

Addressing Involuntary Termination in the
Employment Agreement

Most employment agreements fail to make a distinction as to how a
restrictive covenant is to operate when the employee is discharged,
whether for cause or without cause. Instead, most contracts place resignation and termination for any reason together in one governing
clause. The fundamental problem with this approach is that a court
may invalidate the covenant in a case where the employee is terminated, regardless of how well the company lawyer drafts the contract.
Perhaps the reason that so many covenants fail to differentiate between resignation, termination for cause, and termination without
cause, is that an employee is rarely given the opportunity to suggest
changes or modifications to the employment contract. The contracts
are essentially take-it-or-leave-it documents distributed to all employees that the company seeks to bind to some form of post-employment
restriction.
These 'employer-friendly' agreements, however, may not protect
the employer's interests and may lead to judicial invalidation of the
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contract. Given the reluctance of many courts to enforce non-competition provisions in involuntary discharge cases, an employer should
address the issue specifically in an employment contract. The following steps, if adhered to, can provide an employer and employee with a
clear understanding of the interplay between the employment separation and the enforcement of restrictive covenants, give the parties
flexibility in the event a separation does in fact occur and, perhaps
most importantly, survive judicial scrutiny.
1.

Step 1 - Define "Termination for Cause"

The first step in drafting an effective restrictive covenant provision
is to separate terminations for cause from those without cause.
Rather than relying on a judicial construction of what 'cause' should
encompass, it should be clearly defined in the contract. For instance, a
contract could include the following provisions:
Sec. 1. Under this Agreement, "cause" shall be defined as follows:
(a) conviction of, or plea of nolo contendre, to a felony or other
crime involving moral turpitude; (b) fraud, material dishonesty, embezzlement, or other material misappropriation of property by the
Employee; (c) willful neglect of a defined duty or malfeasance; (d)
willful failure to comply with the provisions of this Agreement, including [section defining job duties]; or (e) willful failure to comply
reasonable and lawful instructions of the Board of
with the 253
Directors.
Sec. 2. If the Company terminates the employee for "cause," as
defined herein, the Company must: (a) provide written notice to the
Employee that the termination is for "cause," setting forth in reasonable detail the nature of such "cause"; and (b) if "cause" is for a
reason set forth in Section 1(c), (d) or (e), give the Employee a
reasonable opportunity to cure the asserted non-compliance or failure to perform, unless the Company determines in good faith that it
would be futile to provide the Employee with such opportunity to
cure.
The failure of an employer to give an employee notice would constitute an admission that the employee was terminated without cause.
This may lead to unanticipated consequences, such as the triggering of
rights to a company severance plan or unemployment compensation.
Therefore, the employer must give proper notice of a termination for
cause. If the reason for cause were a failure to perform a duty under
the contract, then it would be in the best interests of all involved parties if the employee were able to cure the deficiency. However, an
employer may claim that an opportunity to cure was futile and was
253. Depending on the contract and the employee's position in the company, other reasons
may be delineated specifically.
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therefore not warranted if the employee had repeatedly breached his
duties in the past or if the breach was so severe as to impair company
goodwill, destroy a client relationship, or otherwise constitute serious
insubordination.
2.

Step 2 - Equate Termination for Cause with Resignation

The next step is to draft a restrictive covenant that is triggered by a
voluntary resignation and a termination for cause. A sample of an
effective non-competition provision is the following:
Sec. 3. In the event the Employee voluntarily resigns his employment with the Company or is terminated by the Company for
"cause," as defined in Section 1, Employee covenants that he will
not, directly or indirectly, whether as a principal or as a director,
officer, employee, independent contractor, agent, partner, or stockholder to another entity (other than by the ownership of a passive
investment interest of not more than 2.5% in a company with publicly traded securities), render any [define nature of services to be
restricted, e.g., medical, accounting] services to any person or entity
within the Restricted Area for a period of one (1) year from the
date of such resignation or termination ("the Noncompetition
Term"). For purposes of this Section 3, "Restricted Area" is defined as [define desired geographical restriction].
3.

Step 3 - Provide for a Restrictive Covenant in the Event of
Termination Without Cause

The third, and most important, step is to set forth what will happen
with respect to a restrictive covenant when an employee is discharged
without cause. The vast majority of employment contracts ignores this
step and, instead, groups all employment separations together, which
could lead to judicial invalidation of a restrictive covenant if the termination was not for good cause. Using these model provisions, any termination that does not meet the definition of 'cause,' or for which no
notice was provided to the employee, will be interpreted as without
cause. To secure the validity of a non-compete clause in the event of a
termination without cause, the following three sections should be included in the contract:
Sec. 4. In the event the Employee is terminated by the Company
without cause, Employee covenants that he will not, directly or indirectly, whether as a principal or as a director, officer, employee, independent contractor, agent, partner, or stockholder to another
entity (other than by the ownership of a passive investment interest
of not more than 2.5% in a company with publicly traded securities), render any [define nature of services to be restricted, e.g.,
medical, accounting] services to any person or entity within the Restricted Area (as defined above) for a period of one (1) year from
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the date of such termination. This Section 4 is subject to the provisions of Sections 5 and 6.
Sec. 5. The Company may elect, in its sole discretion, to enforce the
provisions of Section 4 herein, provided that, if the Company so
elects, following the date of the Employee's termination without
cause, the Company shall, during the Noncompetition Term: (i) notify the Employee in writing within three (3) days of the effective
date of termination of its election to enforce the provisions of Section 4; (ii) pay the Employee 50% of the Employee's base salary in
monthly installments, at the rate existing as of the date of his termination; and (iii) provide the Employee with the same health insurance and life insurance benefits that he was receiving as of the date
of his termination, with no cost to the Employee.
Sec. 6. In the event the Company elects to cease making payments
and benefits to the Employee under Section 5 at any time during
the Noncompetition Term, it shall provide the Employee notice of
such election and the last date on which the Employee will receive
payments and benefits under Section 5 ("the Termination of Payments Date"). The Company must provide such notice in writing at
least thirty (30) days in advance of the Termination of Payments
Date. If the Company makes such an election and provides the Employee with such notice, the Employee's obligations under Section 4
shall cease on the Termination of Payments Date, and the Noncompetition Term shall expire.
4.

Analysis

Now that the employer has a contract that differentiates between a
termination with cause and one without cause, while allowing it to
enforce a restrictive covenant in both cases, will the covenant be enforced? In Markovits v. Venture Info Capital,Inc.,254 the subject employment agreement contained variations of the provisions as set forth
above. The court, applying Massachusetts's law, upheld the covenant
2 5
as reasonable when the employee was terminated without cause.
The court reasoned that the employment agreement and a stock
agreement, under which the company had bought back Markovits'
stock, were "designed in such a manner that a former employee will
be financially supported regardless of the manner of his
2 56
termination."
Although the stock buy-back was a significant financial boon to
Markovits, the court did not analyze any other factors with respect to
his termination and did not condition its finding of reasonableness on
the stock buy-back. If an employer uses a model contract such as that
254. Markovits v. Venture Info. Capital, Inc., 129 F. Supp. 2d 647 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
255. Id. at 660.
256. Id.
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described above, and similar to that addressed in Venture Info Capital,
the amount of consideration to be provided to an employee in the
event of termination without cause will undoubtedly vary from case to
case. Assuming the employer and employee engage in good faith negotiations, the amount of required consideration will depend on the
likelihood that the employee can find work in another industry until
his non-compete expires, whether he must relocate to another geographic area to find comparable employment, and the degree to which
the employee can impair goodwill and customer relationships if he
were to leave and compete. In the final analysis, the fact that the parties bargain for continued benefits after termination is a clear indicator of reasonableness and will most likely allow a court to uphold the
covenant. If is critical that the employer and employee bargain beforehand for a form of automatic severance that is tied to a restrictive
covenant. Using this flexible approach, the employer has the option
either to enforce the covenant or let the employee compete and receive nothing upon discharge. Most importantly, this bargaining process will help avoid costly, unpredictable litigation.
B.

Negotiating the Separation Agreement

In the vast majority of cases where an employer and employee have
failed to agree beforehand to a termination contingency, the parties
are still left with an option more palatable than litigation: including
the restrictive covenant in the separation agreement. This approach
does give the parties some flexibility. For instance, payments in exchange for a restrictive covenant can be spread out over periods of
time to maximize the tax benefits to the employee without harming
the employer; the employer can create a combination of other benefits, such as covering the cost of COBRA for a period of time, vesting
or granting certain stock options, or providing outplacement services,
among a host of alternatives. This may allow the parties to consider
an employee's unique circumstances, which may not be predictable at
the time the employer and employee begin an employment relationship. Accordingly, the employer must provide the employee with consideration for the covenant, something to which he is not already
entitled upon severance, such as payment under an ERISA-based severance plan or accrued, but unpaid, bonuses.
Clearly, a restrictive covenant entered into between the parties as
part of a settlement or separation agreement satisfies the ancillarity
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requirement. 25 7 In fact, as the Supreme Court of Texas noted in Justin
Belt Co., Inc. v. Yost, not only is it ancillary to a valid contract, but is
also "ancillary to an agreement highly favored by the courts. ' 258 To
this end, the reasonableness of the covenant should be subject to a less
exacting degree of scrutiny. From the employer's perspective, the
downside of negotiating a restrictive covenant as part of a separation
agreement is uncertainty. Presumably, the employer is concerned
about post-employment competition, but there is no way of telling
what a disgruntled employee, or his lawyer, is going to seek for the
non-compete, particularly if he has a viable claim for discrimination or
wrongful discharge. A company's 'low-ball' offer may invite a threat
of litigation by the employee. If the former employee has another
competitive opportunity lined up, he can always pursue a declaratory
judgment action to determine whether the covenant contained in his
employment contract is void in light of the involuntary discharge.
The major problem from the employee's perspective is the absence
of leverage after termination. The employee will most likely want to
complete a deal quickly, in the hopes of securing some payment, or
insurance coverage, to tide him over until he can find new work.
Moreover, if the former employee calls the employer's bluff and seeks
to compete on his own, he runs the risk of getting sued by the employer for violating the covenant, a claim that may or may not have
merit. Very few jurisdictions have any predictable rules, and the employer may determine that its trade secrets, customer relationships
and goodwill are valuable enough to try and protect through litigation.
An employee could face a challenge even if he never executed a
restrictive covenant while employed.2 59 Of course, a court will not use
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing to create what
amounts to an ex post facto non-compete or non-solicit clause. 260
However, the employer could pursue a trade secrets claim, arguing
that the employee's new position will inevitably lead to the disclosure
257. See Justin Belt Co., Inc. v. Yost, 502 S.W.2d 681, 684 (Tex. 1973) (upholding restrictive
covenant in settlement agreement).
258. Id.
259. See Long v. Atlantic PBS, Inc., 681 A.2d 249, 253 (R.I. 1996) (stating that "absent any
enforceable noncompetition agreement, former employees . . . can solicit their previous employer's customers for business, as long as, in doing so, they are not acting tortiously, for example, by interfering unjustifiably with their former employer's contracts, by misappropriating the
employer's trade secrets, or by converting other confidential business information belonging to
their former employer.") (emphasis added).
260. See Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Sempetrean, 525 N.E.2d 1016, 1021 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1988)
(holding that absent a restrictive covenant or some badge of fraud, a former employee may
compete with his former employer and solicit former customers without breaching any implied
covenants of good faith).
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of trade secrets that the employee has previously learned. 261 While
the law is relatively undeveloped with respect to "inevitable disclosure" in the context of employees who do not operate under non-competition clauses, the trend appears to disapprove of such a theory, so
that the employee is allowed to engage in post-employment competition.262

Courts have made it clear that the "umbrella of trade secret

protection should not be deployed to suppress legitimate competition," so an employer must consider what the actual threat really is
before pursuing the employee on this basis. 263 For example, if the employer pursues a trade secrets claim in bad faith to dissuade the employee from competing, it may be liable to the employee for his
attorneys' fees in defending such a suit. 264 Nevertheless, an employer
could sue a former employee for tortious interference with contract if
he attempts to solicit business from customers of the company.2 65
While the law does afford a competitor a qualified privilege to compete in the relevant marketplace, a departed employee still cannot use
wrongful means to compete with his former employer.266 Some employers attempt to dissuade prospective employers from dealing with
the discharged worker by informing them that the employee is subject
to a non-compete agreement, and that the new employer may be 1ia261. See PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1269 (7th Cir. 1995) (applying inevitable
disclosure of trade secrets doctrine even when employee never signed non-compete covenant);
Matthew K. Miller, Note, Inevitable Disclosure Where No Non-Competition Agreement Exists:
Additional Guidance Is Needed, 6 B.U. J. Sci. & TECH. L. 9, 38-49 (Spring 2000) (discussing the
doctrine of inevitable disclosure as well as its application where employee has no non-compete
covenant).
262. See Complete Bus. Solutions, Inc. v. Mauro, No. 01 C 0363, 2001 WL 290196 at *5 (N.D.
Ill. Mar. 16, 2001) (stating that in "cases that have successfully applied the 'inevitable disclosure'
doctrine, the employee had agreed that he would not compete with his former employer for a
fixed period of time...").
263. 3M Co. v. Pribyl, 259 F.3d 587, 595 n.2 (7th Cir. 2001); cf Zep Mfg. Co. v. Harthcock, 824
S.W.2d 654, 663-64 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (action against new employer for tortuous interference
with contract cannot be predicated on underlying non-compete that is invalid).
264. See Telephone Mgmt. Corp. v. Gillette, No. CV 99-1338-KI, 2001 WL 210179, at *3 (D.
Or. Feb. 20, 2001) (awarding attorneys' fees to fired employee in trade secret litigation when
company brought claim in bad faith and could not articulate what trade secrets ex-employee had
misappropriated).
265. Cf. Harthcock, 824 S.W.2d at 663-64 (discussing that tortuous interference with contract
claim requires an employer to prove: (1) a contract; (2) a willful and intentional act that interferes with the contract and was calculated to cause damage to the employer; and (3) actual
damages).
266. See Times Herald Co. v. A.H. Belo Corp., 820 S.W.2d 206, 215 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991)
(noting that a party may cause a customer to terminate a terminable-at-will contract with the
competitor and may obtain the future benefits for the party's own competitive advantage by
offering better contract terms or a higher price); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: COMPETITION AS PROPER OR IMPROPER INTERFERENCE § 768 (1979) (setting forth elements of competi-

tor's privilege).
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ble for tortious interference with contract, or prospective advantage, if
they enable the departed employee to solicit new business. 2 67 However, former employers cannot blithely assert that a departed employee is bound by a restrictive covenant, if he in fact is not, and may
be subject to an injunction prohibiting such misleading
268
representations.
The very fact that an employee has been terminated, in conjunction
with his attempts or threats to compete with his former employer, may
make negotiating a separation agreement contentious and difficult.
As set forth above, myriad issues arise regarding post-employment
competition, even when no clear restrictive covenant is at issue. Litigation, or at the very least threats of litigation, may parallel discussions surrounding the separation document. To be sure, this usually is
not an environment that invites a fair, evenhanded resolution. While
executing a restrictive covenant as part of a separation agreement may
be more attractive than litigating the enforceability of a previouslyexecuted covenant in an employment agreement, this approach is
fraught with uncertainty and is not nearly as effective as addressing
the enforceability of the covenant in the employment contract.
V.

CONCLUSION

In examining covenants not to compete in the context of an involuntary termination, courts should employ a balancing of the equities
approach to give consideration to the nature of the discharge in conjunction with all other relevant factors. For cause/without cause distinctions and categorical rules are inflexible, and their application
inevitably leads the parties into a collateral dispute as to a discharged
employee's work history. The involuntary termination cases analyzed
herein have yielded some bizarre results and poorly reasoned opinions. Employers and their attorneys should seek to avoid these disputes, since it is unpredictable how a court might ultimately rule, or
even what analysis it might apply. The soundest approach is to provide, at the inception of the employment relationship, what happens
to a restrictive covenant when the employee is fired. If drafted properly, the employment contract can give the company an option to en267. See Automated Concepts Inc. v. Weaver, No. 99 C 7599, 2000 WL 1134541 at *5-7 (N.D.
Ill. Aug. 9, 2000) (finding that former employer stated a tortious interference with contract claim
against new employer relating to employee non-compete agreement).
268. See Amalgamated Acme Affiliates, Inc. v. Minton, 33 S.W.3d 387, 392-96 (Tex. Ct. App.
2000) (affirming trial court's entry of temporary restraining order barring former employer from
falsely asserting that departed employee was subject to non-compete agreement; constitutional
prohibition against "prior restraints" on speech not applicable to false and deceptive business
practices).
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force the restrictive covenant in exchange for severance, or simply let
the employee walk away free and clear. While certainly more equitable from the terminated employee's perspective, this approach gives
the employer the opportunity to assess and quantify the competitive
threat posed by the discharged worker without committing itself to a
particular course of action.

